Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Henri Poincaré, Michael Strevens and John L. Pollock

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21 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
8820 Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
8819 We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
10245 One geometry cannot be more true than another [Poincaré]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
15923 Poincaré rejected the actual infinite, claiming definitions gave apparent infinity to finite objects [Poincaré, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
10180 Mathematicians do not study objects, but relations between objects [Poincaré]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
9916 Convention, yes! Arbitrary, no! [Poincaré, by Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
18203 Avoid non-predicative classifications and definitions [Poincaré]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
8822 Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
14365 Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens]
14368 We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens]
14369 Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
8818 Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
8811 What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
8817 Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8814 Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
8823 Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
8813 If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
8812 Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock]
8816 Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
8815 Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
15877 The aim of science is just to create a comprehensive, elegant language to describe brute facts [Poincaré, by Harré]