48 ideas
17651 | Without words or other symbols, we have no world [Goodman] |
17652 | Truth is irrelevant if no statements are involved [Goodman] |
15510 | Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman] |
9920 | Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen] |
10657 | The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
17656 | Being primitive or prior always depends on a constructional system [Goodman] |
18680 | To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi] |
17661 | We don't recognise patterns - we invent them [Goodman] |
17659 | Reality is largely a matter of habit [Goodman] |
17657 | We build our world, and ignore anything that won't fit [Goodman] |
16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
17654 | A world can be full of variety or not, depending on how we sort it [Goodman] |
16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
7956 | If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
7957 | Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
7952 | If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C] |
17653 | Things can only be judged the 'same' by citing some respect of sameness [Goodman] |
12191 | Counterfactuals are true if logical or natural laws imply the consequence [Goodman, by McFetridge] |
22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
17660 | Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman] |
17658 | Users of digital thermometers recognise no temperatures in the gaps [Goodman] |
17650 | We lack frames of reference to transform physics, biology and psychology into one another [Goodman] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
17655 | Grue and green won't be in the same world, as that would block induction entirely [Goodman] |
18684 | Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi] |
20440 | Art is a referential activity, hence indefinable, but it has a set of symptoms [Goodman] |
20439 | Artistic symbols are judged by the fruitfulness of their classifications [Goodman, by Giovannelli] |
8113 | Art is like understanding a natural language, and needs a grasp of a symbol system [Goodman, by Gardner] |
20438 | A performance is only an instance of a work if there is not a single error [Goodman] |
20437 | A copy only becomes an 'instance' of an artwork if there is a system of notation [Goodman] |
18666 | Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi] |
18667 | The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi] |
18685 | Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi] |
18679 | Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi] |
18682 | A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi] |
18683 | Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi] |
18686 | The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi] |
18672 | Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi] |
18677 | A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi] |
18668 | Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi] |
18670 | The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi] |
18669 | Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi] |
17649 | If the world is one it has many aspects, and if there are many worlds they will collect into one [Goodman] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |