Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Henry of Ghent, John Wycliff and Luitzen E.J. Brouwer

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16 ideas

4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
12452 Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
15941 For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
18119 Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
18247 Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
18118 Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
12451 Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
12454 Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
12453 Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
8728 Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
16657 Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
16658 The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16645 Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16700 In order to speak about time and successive entities, the 'present' must be enlarged [Wycliff]
16701 To be successive a thing needs parts, which must therefore be lodged outside that instant [Wycliff]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22012 Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
10117 Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]