35 ideas
6405 | Moore's 'The Nature of Judgement' (1898) marked the rejection (with Russell) of idealism [Moore,GE, by Grayling] |
17992 | The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE] |
18859 | Metaphysics is a quest for truthmakers [Tallant] |
7527 | Analysis for Moore and Russell is carving up the world, not investigating language [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
18861 | Maybe number statements can be paraphrased into quantifications plus identities [Tallant] |
18866 | Maybe only 'positive' truths need truth-makers [Tallant] |
18860 | A truthmaker is the minimal portion of reality that will do the job [Tallant] |
18863 | What is the truthmaker for a possible new power? [Tallant] |
16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
21342 | A relation is internal if two things possessing the relation could not fail to be related [Moore,GE, by Heil] |
16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
18864 | The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant] |
18865 | Substance must have two properties: individuation, and property-bearing [Tallant] |
6672 | Moore's Paradox: you can't assert 'I believe that p but p is false', but can assert 'You believe p but p is false' [Moore,GE, by Lowe] |
20147 | Arguments that my finger does not exist are less certain than your seeing my finger [Moore,GE] |
6349 | I can prove a hand exists, by holding one up, pointing to it, and saying 'here is one hand' [Moore,GE] |
22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
18862 | Are propositions all the thoughts and sentences that are possible? [Tallant] |
22302 | Moor bypassed problems of correspondence by saying true propositions ARE facts [Moore,GE, by Potter] |
7526 | Hegelians say propositions defy analysis, but Moore says they can be broken down [Moore,GE, by Monk] |
21233 | The beautiful is whatever it is intrinsically good to admire [Moore,GE] |
8039 | Moore tries to show that 'good' is indefinable, but doesn't understand what a definition is [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
22151 | The Open Question argument leads to anti-realism and the fact-value distinction [Boulter on Moore,GE] |
11056 | The naturalistic fallacy claims that natural qualties can define 'good' [Moore,GE] |
8033 | Moore cannot show why something being good gives us a reason for action [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
8032 | Can learning to recognise a good friend help us to recognise a good watch? [MacIntyre on Moore,GE] |
11050 | Moore's combination of antinaturalism with strong supervenience on the natural is incoherent [Hanna on Moore,GE] |
23726 | Despite Moore's caution, non-naturalists incline towards intuitionism [Moore,GE, by Smith,M] |
18676 | We should ask what we would judge to be good if it existed in absolute isolation [Moore,GE] |
11057 | It is always an open question whether anything that is natural is good [Moore,GE] |
5925 | The three main values are good, right and beauty [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
5902 | For Moore, 'right' is what produces good [Moore,GE, by Ross] |
5903 | 'Right' means 'cause of good result' (hence 'useful'), so the end does justify the means [Moore,GE] |
5907 | Relationships imply duties to people, not merely the obligation to benefit them [Ross on Moore,GE] |