Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Henry of Ghent, Jos L. Zalabardo and Richard L. Kirkham

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29 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo]
A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo]
Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo]
We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo]
'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo]
A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo]
An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]