32 ideas
9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
10429 | It is best to say that a name designates iff there is something for it to designate [Sainsbury] |
10425 | Definite descriptions may not be referring expressions, since they can fail to refer [Sainsbury] |
10438 | Definite descriptions are usually rigid in subject, but not in predicate, position [Sainsbury] |
8983 | If 'red' is vague, then membership of the set of red things is vague, so there is no set of red things [Sainsbury] |
9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
8986 | We should abandon classifying by pigeon-holes, and classify around paradigms [Sainsbury] |
16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
8982 | Vague concepts are concepts without boundaries [Sainsbury] |
8984 | If concepts are vague, people avoid boundaries, can't spot them, and don't want them [Sainsbury] |
8985 | Boundaryless concepts tend to come in pairs, such as child/adult, hot/cold [Sainsbury] |
9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
10432 | A new usage of a name could arise from a mistaken baptism of nothing [Sainsbury] |
10434 | Even a quantifier like 'someone' can be used referentially [Sainsbury] |
10431 | Things are thought to have a function, even when they can't perform them [Sainsbury] |