Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Henry of Ghent, Peter Unger and Gordon Graham

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23 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
9052 Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
16657 Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
16658 The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16645 Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
16070 There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
22012 Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
8724 The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
8722 No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 4. Demon Scepticism
8723 An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
6685 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
6699 The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6698 Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
6700 We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
6704 Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
6701 Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
6693 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
6691 It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
6688 Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
6705 Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
6690 A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
6689 The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
6706 The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
6709 Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham]