121 ideas
3798 | An overexamined life is as bad as an unexamined one [Dennett] |
3801 | Rationality requires the assumption that things are either for better or worse [Dennett] |
14227 | We could refer to tables as 'xs that are arranged tablewise' [Inwagen] |
8972 | What in the real world could ground the distinction between the sets {A,{A,B}} and {B,{A,B}}? [Inwagen] |
10662 | Mereology is 'nihilistic' (just atoms) or 'universal' (no restrictions on what is 'whole') [Inwagen, by Varzi] |
17587 | The 'Law' of Excluded Middle needs all propositions to be definitely true or definitely false [Inwagen] |
17558 | Variables are just like pronouns; syntactic explanations get muddled over dummy letters [Inwagen] |
17583 | There are no heaps [Inwagen] |
17578 | I reject talk of 'stuff', and treat it in terms of particles [Inwagen] |
17582 | Singular terms can be vague, because they can contain predicates, which can be vague [Inwagen] |
16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
14308 | We can bring dispositions into existence, as in creating an identifier [Dennett, by Mumford] |
17556 | Material objects are in space and time, move, have a surface and mass, and are made of some stuff [Inwagen] |
8264 | Maybe table-shaped particles exist, but not tables [Inwagen, by Lowe] |
17565 | Nihilism says composition between single things is impossible [Inwagen] |
14228 | If there are no tables, but tables are things arranged tablewise, the denial of tables is a contradiction [Liggins on Inwagen] |
14468 | Actions by artefacts and natural bodies are disguised cooperations, so we don't need them [Inwagen] |
17571 | Every physical thing is either a living organism or a simple [Inwagen] |
17562 | The statue and lump seem to share parts, but the statue is not part of the lump [Inwagen] |
17574 | If you knead clay you make an infinite series of objects, but they are rearrangements, not creations [Inwagen] |
17531 | I assume matter is particulate, made up of 'simples' [Inwagen] |
17560 | If contact causes composition, do two colliding balls briefly make one object? [Inwagen] |
17561 | If bricks compose a house, that is at least one thing, but it might be many things [Inwagen] |
17566 | I think parthood involves causation, and not just a reasonably stable spatial relationship [Inwagen] |
14230 | We can deny whole objects but accept parts, by referring to them as plurals within things [Inwagen, by Liggins] |
17557 | Special Composition Question: when is a thing part of something? [Inwagen] |
17564 | The essence of a star includes the released binding energy which keeps it from collapse [Inwagen] |
17575 | The persistence of artifacts always covertly involves intelligent beings [Inwagen] |
7384 | Words are fixed by being attached to similarity clusters, without mention of 'essences' [Dennett] |
17577 | When an electron 'leaps' to another orbit, is the new one the same electron? [Inwagen] |
17589 | If you reject transitivity of vague identity, there is no Ship of Theseus problem [Inwagen] |
17588 | We should talk of the transitivity of 'identity', and of 'definite identity' [Inwagen] |
17572 | Actuality proves possibility, but that doesn't explain how it is possible [Inwagen] |
2526 | Philosophers regularly confuse failures of imagination with insights into necessity [Dennett] |
3802 | Why pronounce impossible what you cannot imagine? [Dennett] |
17579 | Counterparts reduce counterfactual identity to problems about similarity relations [Inwagen] |
17590 | A merely possible object clearly isn't there, so that is a defective notion [Inwagen] |
17591 | Merely possible objects must be consistent properties, or haecceities [Inwagen] |
22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
7374 | Light wavelengths entering the eye are only indirectly related to object colours [Dennett] |
2523 | That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett] |
3795 | Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett] |
7369 | Brains are essentially anticipation machines [Dennett] |
4608 | Minds are hard-wired, or trial-and-error, or experimental, or full self-aware [Dennett, by Heil] |
7393 | We can't draw a clear line between conscious and unconscious [Dennett] |
7367 | Perhaps the brain doesn't 'fill in' gaps in consciousness if no one is looking. [Dennett] |
4880 | Sentience comes in grades from robotic to super-human; we only draw a line for moral reasons [Dennett] |
2528 | Does consciousness need the concept of consciousness? [Dennett] |
2525 | Maybe language is crucial to consciousness [Dennett] |
7394 | Conscious events can only be explained in terms of unconscious events [Dennett] |
7391 | We can know a lot of what it is like to be a bat, and nothing important is unknown [Dennett] |
3158 | Theories of intentionality presuppose rationality, so can't explain it [Dennett] |
2527 | Unconscious intentionality is the foundation of the mind [Dennett] |
6624 | Dennett denies the existence of qualia [Dennett, by Lowe] |
4873 | What is it like to notice an uncomfortable position when you are asleep? [Dennett] |
7387 | "Qualia" can be replaced by complex dispositional brain states [Dennett] |
7658 | Obviously there can't be a functional anaylsis of qualia if they are defined by intrinsic properties [Dennett] |
7376 | We can't assume that dispositions will remain normal when qualia have been inverted [Dennett] |
7372 | In peripheral vision we see objects without their details, so blindsight is not that special [Dennett] |
7373 | Blindsight subjects glean very paltry information [Dennett] |
3797 | I am the sum total of what I directly control [Dennett] |
7385 | People accept blurred boundaries in many things, but insist self is All or Nothing [Dennett] |
4881 | Being a person must involve having second-order beliefs and desires (about beliefs and desires) [Dennett] |
7383 | The psychological self is an abstraction, not a thing in the brain [Dennett] |
7386 | Selves are not soul-pearls, but artefacts of social processes [Dennett] |
7381 | We tell stories about ourselves, to protect, control and define who we are [Dennett] |
7382 | We spin narratives about ourselves, and the audience posits a centre of gravity for them [Dennett] |
7370 | The brain is controlled by shifting coalitions, guided by good purposeful habits [Dennett] |
7655 | The work done by the 'homunculus in the theatre' must be spread amongst non-conscious agencies [Dennett] |
3800 | You can be free even though force would have prevented you doing otherwise [Dennett, by PG] |
3803 | Can we conceive of a being with a will freer than our own? [Dennett] |
3791 | Awareness of thought is a step beyond awareness of the world [Dennett] |
3794 | Foreknowledge permits control [Dennett] |
6981 | Determinism clashes with free will, as the past determines action, and is beyond our control [Inwagen, by Jackson] |
7379 | If an epiphenomenon has no physical effects, it has to be undetectable [Dennett] |
7365 | Dualism wallows in mystery, and to accept it is to give up [Dennett] |
3159 | Beliefs and desires aren't real; they are prediction techniques [Dennett] |
3796 | The active self is a fiction created because we are ignorant of our motivations [Dennett] |
3161 | If mind is just an explanation, the explainer must have beliefs [Rey on Dennett] |
3986 | The 'intentional stance' is a way of interpreting an entity by assuming it is rational and self-aware [Dennett] |
2530 | Could a robot be made conscious just by software? [Dennett] |
7371 | All functionalism is 'homuncular', of one grain size or another [Dennett] |
4875 | We descend from robots, and our intentionality is composed of billions of crude intentional systems [Dennett] |
4879 | There is no more anger in adrenaline than silliness in a bottle of whiskey [Dennett] |
7657 | Intelligent agents are composed of nested homunculi, of decreasing intelligence, ending in machines [Dennett] |
7656 | I don't deny consciousness; it just isn't what people think it is [Dennett] |
7366 | It is arbitrary to say which moment of brain processing is conscious [Dennett] |
7380 | Visual experience is composed of neural activity, which we find pleasing [Dennett] |
4876 | Maybe there is a minimum brain speed for supporting a mind [Dennett] |
4878 | The materials for a mind only matter because of speed, and a need for transducers and effectors [Dennett] |
3177 | You couldn't drive a car without folk psychology [Dennett] |
3987 | Like the 'centre of gravity', desires and beliefs are abstract concepts with no actual existence [Dennett] |
4874 | The predecessor and rival of the language of thought hypothesis is the picture theory of ideas [Dennett] |
2524 | A language of thought doesn't explain content [Dennett] |
7654 | What matters about neuro-science is the discovery of the functional role of the chemistry [Dennett] |
23803 | States have content if we can predict them well by assuming intentionality [Dennett, by Schulte] |
3984 | The nature of content is entirely based on its functional role [Dennett] |
4882 | Concepts are things we (unlike dogs) can think about, because we have language [Dennett] |
2529 | Maybe there can be non-conscious concepts (e.g. in bees) [Dennett] |
7101 | Virtue theory needs an external standard to judge behaviour and character [Inwagen, by Statman] |
3983 | Learning is evolution in the brain [Dennett] |
4872 | Most people see an abortion differently if the foetus lacks a brain [Dennett] |
7368 | Originally there were no reasons, purposes or functions; since there were no interests, there were only causes [Dennett] |
17563 | The strong force pulls, but also pushes apart if nucleons get too close together [Inwagen] |
17559 | Is one atom a piece of gold, or is a sizable group of atoms required? [Inwagen] |
3985 | Biology is a type of engineering, not a search for laws of nature [Dennett] |
17568 | A tumour may spread a sort of life, but it is not a life, or an organism [Inwagen] |
17581 | Being part of an organism's life is a matter of degree, and vague [Inwagen] |
17586 | At the lower level, life trails off into mere molecular interaction [Inwagen] |
4877 | Maybe plants are very slow (and sentient) animals, overlooked because we are faster? [Dennett] |
17567 | A flame is like a life, but not nearly so well individuated [Inwagen] |
17576 | If God were to 'reassemble' my atoms of ten years ago, the result would certainly not be me [Inwagen] |
17584 | Some events are only borderline cases of lives [Inwagen] |
17569 | Unlike waves, lives are 'jealous'; it is almost impossible for them to overlap [Inwagen] |
17580 | One's mental and other life is centred on the brain, unlike any other part of the body [Inwagen] |
17570 | The chemical reactions in a human life involve about sixteen elements [Inwagen] |
17585 | Life is vague at both ends, but could it be totally vague? [Inwagen] |
3804 | Darwin's idea was the best idea ever [Dennett] |
17573 | There is no reason to think that mere existence is a valuable thing [Inwagen] |