37 ideas
13966 | Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames] |
19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
13974 | If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames] |
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
15163 | The interest of quantified modal logic is its metaphysical necessity and essentialism [Soames] |
15158 | Indefinite descriptions are quantificational in subject position, but not in predicate position [Soames] |
15157 | Recognising the definite description 'the man' as a quantifier phrase, not a singular term, is a real insight [Soames] |
15156 | The universal and existential quantifiers were chosen to suit mathematics [Soames] |
16657 | Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent] |
16658 | The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent] |
16645 | Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent] |
13969 | Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames] |
15162 | We understand metaphysical necessity intuitively, from ordinary life [Soames] |
15161 | There are more metaphysically than logically necessary truths [Soames] |
13973 | A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames] |
13968 | Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames] |
22012 | Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
15152 | To study meaning, study truth conditions, on the basis of syntax, and representation by the parts [Soames] |
15153 | Tarski's account of truth-conditions is too weak to determine meanings [Soames] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
13965 | Semantics as theory of meaning and semantics as truth-based logical consequence are very different [Soames] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
13964 | Semantic content is a proposition made of sentence constituents (not some set of circumstances) [Soames] |
13972 | Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames] |
15154 | We should use cognitive states to explain representational propositions, not vice versa [Soames] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |