Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Henry of Ghent, William Whewell and Paul Boghossian

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19 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Substance, Quantity and Quality are real; other categories depend on those three [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The only reality in the category of Relation is things from another category [Henry of Ghent]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
Accidents are diminished beings, because they are dispositions of substance (unqualified being) [Henry of Ghent]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Kant says things-in-themselves cause sensations, but then makes causation transcendental! [Henry of Ghent, by Pinkard]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
Consilience is a common groundwork of explanation [Whewell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]