Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Brian Clegg and Henry Laycock

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31 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg]
Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg]
An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / k. Imaginary numbers
By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg]
The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]