19 ideas
18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
13127 | Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff] |
8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |