Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, D.H. Mellor and Luitzen E.J. Brouwer

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19 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
Our dislike of contradiction in logic is a matter of psychology, not mathematics [Brouwer]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
For intuitionists excluded middle is an outdated historical convention [Brouwer]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics is a mental activity which does not use language [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / h. Reals from Cauchy
Brouwer saw reals as potential, not actual, and produced by a rule, or a choice [Brouwer, by Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
Scientific laws largely rest on the results of counting and measuring [Brouwer]
Brouwer regards the application of mathematics to the world as somehow 'wicked' [Brouwer, by Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
Intuitionists only accept denumerable sets [Brouwer]
Neo-intuitionism abstracts from the reuniting of moments, to intuit bare two-oneness [Brouwer]
Intuitionist mathematics deduces by introspective construction, and rejects unknown truths [Brouwer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Intuitonists in mathematics worried about unjustified assertion, as well as contradiction [Brouwer, by George/Velleman]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor]
Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]