17 ideas
9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |