350 ideas
7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
3600 | Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes] |
3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
3601 | Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes] |
3602 | Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes] |
21962 | Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes] |
24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
3653 | My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes] |
1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
3603 | Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG] |
2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
18137 | Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock] |
3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
4736 | Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes] |
3610 | Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes] |
2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
4298 | All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference [Descartes] |
13439 | Venn Diagrams map three predicates into eight compartments, then look for the conclusion [Bostock] |
13421 | 'Disjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no conjunction has a disjunction within its scope [Bostock] |
13422 | 'Conjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no disjunction has a conjunction within its scope [Bostock] |
13355 | 'Disjunction' says that Γ,φ∨ψ|= iff Γ,φ|= and Γ,ψ|= [Bostock] |
13350 | 'Assumptions' says that a formula entails itself (φ|=φ) [Bostock] |
13351 | 'Thinning' allows that if premisses entail a conclusion, then adding further premisses makes no difference [Bostock] |
13356 | The 'conditional' is that Γ|=φ→ψ iff Γ,φ|=ψ [Bostock] |
13352 | 'Cutting' allows that if x is proved, and adding y then proves z, you can go straight to z [Bostock] |
13353 | 'Negation' says that Γ,¬φ|= iff Γ|=φ [Bostock] |
13354 | 'Conjunction' says that Γ|=φ∧ψ iff Γ|=φ and Γ|=ψ [Bostock] |
13610 | A logic with ¬ and → needs three axiom-schemas and one rule as foundation [Bostock] |
18122 | Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock] |
13846 | A 'free' logic can have empty names, and a 'universally free' logic can have empty domains [Bostock] |
18114 | There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock] |
18107 | A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock] |
18115 | We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock] |
18139 | The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock] |
18105 | Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock] |
18108 | First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock] |
18109 | The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock] |
13346 | Truth is the basic notion in classical logic [Bostock] |
13545 | Elementary logic cannot distinguish clearly between the finite and the infinite [Bostock] |
13822 | Fictional characters wreck elementary logic, as they have contradictions and no excluded middle [Bostock] |
13623 | The syntactic turnstile |- φ means 'there is a proof of φ' or 'φ is a theorem' [Bostock] |
13347 | Validity is a conclusion following for premises, even if there is no proof [Bostock] |
13348 | It seems more natural to express |= as 'therefore', rather than 'entails' [Bostock] |
13349 | Γ|=φ is 'entails'; Γ|= is 'is inconsistent'; |=φ is 'valid' [Bostock] |
13614 | MPP: 'If Γ|=φ and Γ|=φ→ψ then Γ|=ψ' (omit Γs for Detachment) [Bostock] |
13617 | MPP is a converse of Deduction: If Γ |- φ→ψ then Γ,φ|-ψ [Bostock] |
10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
13800 | |= α=α and α=β |= φ(α/ξ ↔ φ(β/ξ) fix identity [Bostock] |
13803 | If we are to express that there at least two things, we need identity [Bostock] |
13799 | The sign '=' is a two-place predicate expressing that 'a is the same thing as b' (a=b) [Bostock] |
13357 | Truth-functors are usually held to be defined by their truth-tables [Bostock] |
13812 | A 'zero-place' function just has a single value, so it is a name [Bostock] |
13811 | A 'total' function ranges over the whole domain, a 'partial' function over appropriate inputs [Bostock] |
13360 | In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock] |
13361 | An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock] |
13814 | Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock] |
13816 | Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock] |
13817 | Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock] |
13848 | We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock] |
13813 | Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock] |
13815 | Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock] |
13438 | 'Prenex normal form' is all quantifiers at the beginning, out of the scope of truth-functors [Bostock] |
13818 | If we allow empty domains, we must allow empty names [Bostock] |
18123 | Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock] |
13801 | An 'informal proof' is in no particular system, and uses obvious steps and some ordinary English [Bostock] |
13619 | Quantification adds two axiom-schemas and a new rule [Bostock] |
13622 | Axiom systems from Frege, Russell, Church, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, Nicod, Kleene, Quine... [Bostock] |
13615 | 'Conditonalised' inferences point to the Deduction Theorem: If Γ,φ|-ψ then Γ|-φ→ψ [Bostock] |
13620 | Proof by Assumptions can always be reduced to Proof by Axioms, using the Deduction Theorem [Bostock] |
13621 | The Deduction Theorem and Reductio can 'discharge' assumptions - they aren't needed for the new truth [Bostock] |
13616 | The Deduction Theorem greatly simplifies the search for proof [Bostock] |
18120 | The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock] |
13753 | Natural deduction takes proof from assumptions (with its rules) as basic, and axioms play no part [Bostock] |
13755 | Excluded middle is an introduction rule for negation, and ex falso quodlibet will eliminate it [Bostock] |
13758 | In natural deduction we work from the premisses and the conclusion, hoping to meet in the middle [Bostock] |
13754 | Natural deduction rules for → are the Deduction Theorem (→I) and Modus Ponens (→E) [Bostock] |
13611 | Tableau proofs use reduction - seeking an impossible consequence from an assumption [Bostock] |
13613 | A completed open branch gives an interpretation which verifies those formulae [Bostock] |
13612 | Non-branching rules add lines, and branching rules need a split; a branch with a contradiction is 'closed' [Bostock] |
13761 | In a tableau proof no sequence is established until the final branch is closed; hypotheses are explored [Bostock] |
13757 | Unlike natural deduction, semantic tableaux have recipes for proving things [Bostock] |
13756 | A tree proof becomes too broad if its only rule is Modus Ponens [Bostock] |
13762 | Tableau rules are all elimination rules, gradually shortening formulae [Bostock] |
13759 | Each line of a sequent calculus is a conclusion of previous lines, each one explicitly recorded [Bostock] |
13760 | A sequent calculus is good for comparing proof systems [Bostock] |
13364 | Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first [Bostock, by PG] |
13821 | Extensionality is built into ordinary logic semantics; names have objects, predicates have sets of objects [Bostock] |
13362 | If an object has two names, truth is undisturbed if the names are swapped; this is Extensionality [Bostock] |
13541 | For 'negation-consistent', there is never |-(S)φ and |-(S)¬φ [Bostock] |
13542 | A proof-system is 'absolutely consistent' iff we don't have |-(S)φ for every formula [Bostock] |
13540 | A set of formulae is 'inconsistent' when there is no interpretation which can make them all true [Bostock] |
13544 | Inconsistency or entailment just from functors and quantifiers is finitely based, if compact [Bostock] |
13618 | Compactness means an infinity of sequents on the left will add nothing new [Bostock] |
18125 | Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock] |
2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
18101 | Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock] |
18100 | ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock] |
18102 | A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock] |
18106 | Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock] |
18095 | Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock] |
18099 | The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock] |
13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
18093 | For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock] |
24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
18110 | Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock] |
18156 | Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock] |
18097 | The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock] |
13358 | Ordinary or mathematical induction assumes for the first, then always for the next, and hence for all [Bostock] |
13359 | Complete induction assumes for all numbers less than n, then also for n, and hence for all numbers [Bostock] |
18148 | Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock] |
18145 | Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock] |
18149 | There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock] |
18143 | Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock] |
18116 | Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock] |
18117 | Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock] |
18141 | Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock] |
18157 | Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock] |
18150 | Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock] |
21963 | It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes] |
18158 | Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock] |
18127 | Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock] |
18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
18146 | If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock] |
18129 | Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock] |
18111 | Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock] |
18159 | Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock] |
18155 | A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock] |
18140 | The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock] |
18138 | Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock] |
18131 | If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock] |
18134 | Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock] |
18135 | If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock] |
18136 | If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock] |
18132 | The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock] |
18133 | The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock] |
24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
13543 | A relation is not reflexive, just because it is transitive and symmetrical [Bostock] |
13802 | Relations can be one-many (at most one on the left) or many-one (at most one on the right) [Bostock] |
16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
12251 | Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes] |
13847 | If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock] |
13820 | The idea that anything which can be proved is necessary has a problem with empty names [Bostock] |
24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
3605 | We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes] |
20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
9807 | In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes] |
1583 | In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes] |
1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
3657 | Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes] |
2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |
24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
3607 | In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes] |
3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
3617 | I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes] |
6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
22593 | Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes] |
7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
3611 | Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes] |
2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
3606 | I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes] |
2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
3621 | Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes] |
2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
3604 | When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes] |
2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
3618 | Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes] |
4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
3615 | Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes] |
24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
3609 | I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes] |
1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
3789 | The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am [Descartes] |
2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
3608 | I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes] |
3613 | Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes] |
2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
3616 | The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes] |
6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
3614 | A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes] |
5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
13363 | A (modern) predicate is the result of leaving a gap for the name in a sentence [Bostock] |
18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
1581 | Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes] |
4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
16569 | The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes] |
16684 | Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes] |
6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
16686 | God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes] |
20964 | Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau] |
2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
3637 | Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes] |
2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
16712 | Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country [Descartes] |
3660 | Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes] |
16772 | An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
3652 | I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes] |
3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |