Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, David Liggins and Stewart Cohen

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21 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
14231 We should always apply someone's theory of meaning to their own utterances [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14232 We normally formalise 'There are Fs' with singular quantification and predication, but this may be wrong [Liggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
14233 Nihilists needn't deny parts - they can just say that some of the xs are among the ys [Liggins]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
19558 Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
19561 We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
19563 The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
19560 Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
12893 Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
12896 Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
12894 There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19559 Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
6005 Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]