Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Earl Conee and David Kaplan

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan]
Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan]
'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan]
If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee]
More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee]
Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
People begin to doubt whether they 'know' when the answer becomes more significant [Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
Maybe low knowledge standards are loose talk; people will deny that it is 'really and truly' knowledge [Conee]
Maybe knowledge has fixed standards (high, but attainable), although people apply contextual standards [Conee]
That standards vary with context doesn't imply different truth-conditions for judgements [Conee]
Maybe there is only one context (the 'really and truly' one) for serious discussions of knowledge [Conee]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro]
'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]