Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Feferman / Feferman and Ned Markosian

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26 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
People who use science to make philosophical points don't realise how philosophical science is [Markosian]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
Presentism has the problem that if Socrates ceases to exist, so do propositions about him [Markosian]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice is consistent with the other axioms of set theory [Feferman/Feferman]
Axiom of Choice: a set exists which chooses just one element each of any set of sets [Feferman/Feferman]
Platonist will accept the Axiom of Choice, but others want criteria of selection or definition [Feferman/Feferman]
The Trichotomy Principle is equivalent to the Axiom of Choice [Feferman/Feferman]
Cantor's theories needed the Axiom of Choice, but it has led to great controversy [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A structure is a 'model' when the axioms are true. So which of the structures are models? [Feferman/Feferman]
Tarski and Vaught established the equivalence relations between first-order structures [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Löwenheim-Skolem says if the sentences are countable, so is the model [Feferman/Feferman]
Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem, and Gödel's completeness of first-order logic, the earliest model theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
If a sentence holds in every model of a theory, then it is logically derivable from the theory [Feferman/Feferman]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
'Recursion theory' concerns what can be solved by computing machines [Feferman/Feferman]
Both Principia Mathematica and Peano Arithmetic are undecidable [Feferman/Feferman]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Possible worlds must be abstract, because two qualitatively identical worlds are just one world [Markosian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
'Grabby' truth conditions first select their object, unlike 'searchy' truth conditions [Markosian]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentism is the view that only present objects exist [Markosian]
Presentism says if objects don't exist now, we can't have attitudes to them or relations with them [Markosian]
Presentism seems to entail that we cannot talk about other times [Markosian]
Serious Presentism says things must exist to have relations and properties; Unrestricted version denies this [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can refer to the haecceity of a thing, after the thing itself disappears [Markosian]
Maybe Presentists can paraphrase singular propositions about the past [Markosian]
Special Relativity denies the absolute present which Presentism needs [Markosian]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
Objects in the past, like Socrates, are more like imaginary objects than like remote spatial objects [Markosian]
People are mistaken when they think 'Socrates was a philosopher' says something [Markosian]