Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Francesco Orsi and Anon (Diss)

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24 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
1564 True and false statements can use exactly the same words [Anon (Diss)]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
1559 Thracians think tattooing adds to a girl's beauty, but elsewhere it is a punishment [Anon (Diss)]
1561 Anything can be acceptable in some circumstances and unacceptable in others [Anon (Diss)]
1560 Lydians prostitute their daughters to raise a dowery, but no Greek would marry such a girl [Anon (Diss)]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
1567 How could someone who knows everything fail to act correctly? [Anon (Diss)]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
1563 Every apparent crime can be right in certain circumstances [Anon (Diss), by PG]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
1562 It is right to lie to someone, to get them to take medicine they are reluctant to take [Anon (Diss)]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
1566 The first priority in elections is to vote for people who support democracy [Anon (Diss)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
1565 We learn language, and we don't know who teaches us it [Anon (Diss)]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
6005 Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]