Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Gilbert Harman and Roger Scruton

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178 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation
Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 8. Humour
Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton]
The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton]
Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton]
Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 6. Deconstruction
On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton]
Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Inference is never a conscious process [Harman]
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman]
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman]
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 4. Open Question
We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman]
Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman]
A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman]
Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton]
If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Best Explanation is the core notion of epistemology [Harman, by Smart]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Defining dispositions is circular [Harman]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman]
Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / c. Animal rationality
Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 9. Ambiguity
Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton]
Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton]
The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton]
Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton]
Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton]
Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton]
Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 5. Art as Language
In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton]
If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman]
Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman]
If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman]
Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton]
That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton]
Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton]
Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton]
Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton]
The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 3. Conservatism
Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton]
So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton]
Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton]
Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton]
An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton]
I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton]
Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton]
We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton]
Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton]
Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton]
Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton]
We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton]
Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton]
Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton]
Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton]