683 ideas
16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
21461 | I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views [Lewis] |
13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
22270 | Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege] |
15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
8939 | We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher] |
15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
4971 | I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege] |
17745 | For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki] |
16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
18395 | Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong] |
15496 | We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis] |
10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
15500 | Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis] |
15499 | A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis] |
9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
14238 | A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege] |
15503 | We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis] |
15498 | We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis] |
15502 | There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis] |
10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
15506 | If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis] |
15497 | We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis] |
15511 | If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis] |
15513 | Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis] |
10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
15507 | Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis] |
10191 | Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride] |
18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
15508 | If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis] |
15514 | A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis] |
15523 | Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis] |
9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
7728 | Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner] |
16881 | The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege] |
7622 | In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam] |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
7729 | Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner] |
8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9950 | A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9991 | For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait] |
10536 | Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege] |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
7730 | Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner] |
7742 | Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh] |
9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
15525 | Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis] |
15518 | I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
13824 | Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz] |
13609 | Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan] |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
16886 | The truth of an axiom must be independently recognisable [Frege] |
17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
18256 | Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege] |
8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
17855 | It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C] |
10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
15524 | Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis] |
15517 | Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis] |
16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
15515 | To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis] |
10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
9831 | Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege] |
8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
9577 | The naďve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
10607 | Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P] |
10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
9545 | Late in life Frege abandoned logicism, and saw the source of arithmetic as geometrical [Frege, by Chihara] |
9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
11008 | Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
14401 | Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis] |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
15540 | You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
16210 | Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis] |
10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
15501 | We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis] |
15504 | Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
16458 | Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis] |
9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
15538 | Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis] |
17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
4038 | Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver] |
15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
15516 | A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis] |
9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
15453 | The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis] |
15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
15537 | If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis] |
9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
15536 | We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis] |
15452 | We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis] |
15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
14748 | The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis] |
6129 | Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
15512 | In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis] |
15519 | Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis] |
15521 | Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis] |
15522 | The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis] |
14244 | Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis] |
10660 | A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis] |
10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
10566 | Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
14361 | Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson] |
8434 | In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
15509 | Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis] |
16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
11052 | Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege] |
16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
8209 | Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis] |
15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
7441 | Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis] |
7442 | 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis] |
7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
18265 | We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement [Frege] |
16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
22280 | Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter] |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
8433 | There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |
9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
9426 | The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis] |
9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
23019 | The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
23021 | Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
7741 | The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner] |
22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |