Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Graham Priest and Martha Nussbaum

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60 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Someone standing in a doorway seems to be both in and not-in the room [Priest,G, by Sorensen]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Keep premises as weak as possible, to avoid controversial difficulties [Nussbaum]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
A logic is 'relevant' if premise and conclusion are connected, and 'paraconsistent' allows contradictions [Priest,G, by Friend]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic is one of the few first-order non-classical logics [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
X1 x X2 x X3... x Xn indicates the 'cartesian product' of those sets [Priest,G]
<a,b&62; is a set whose members occur in the order shown [Priest,G]
a ∈ X says a is an object in set X; a ∉ X says a is not in X [Priest,G]
{x; A(x)} is a set of objects satisfying the condition A(x) [Priest,G]
{a1, a2, ...an} indicates that a set comprising just those objects [Priest,G]
Φ indicates the empty set, which has no members [Priest,G]
{a} is the 'singleton' set of a (not the object a itself) [Priest,G]
X⊂Y means set X is a 'proper subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
X⊆Y means set X is a 'subset' of set Y [Priest,G]
X = Y means the set X equals the set Y [Priest,G]
X ∩ Y indicates the 'intersection' of sets X and Y, the objects which are in both sets [Priest,G]
X∪Y indicates the 'union' of all the things in sets X and Y [Priest,G]
Y - X is the 'relative complement' of X with respect to Y; the things in Y that are not in X [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'relative complement' is things in the second set not in the first [Priest,G]
The 'intersection' of two sets is a set of the things that are in both sets [Priest,G]
The 'union' of two sets is a set containing all the things in either of the sets [Priest,G]
The 'induction clause' says complex formulas retain the properties of their basic formulas [Priest,G]
An 'ordered pair' (or ordered n-tuple) is a set with its members in a particular order [Priest,G]
A 'cartesian product' of sets is the set of all the n-tuples with one member in each of the sets [Priest,G]
A 'set' is a collection of objects [Priest,G]
The 'empty set' or 'null set' has no members [Priest,G]
A set is a 'subset' of another set if all of its members are in that set [Priest,G]
A 'proper subset' is smaller than the containing set [Priest,G]
A 'singleton' is a set with only one member [Priest,G]
A 'member' of a set is one of the objects in the set [Priest,G]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / c. Basic theorems of ST
The empty set Φ is a subset of every set (including itself) [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 1. Paradox
Typically, paradoxes are dealt with by dividing them into two groups, but the division is wrong [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / b. König's paradox
The 'least indefinable ordinal' is defined by that very phrase [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
'x is a natural number definable in less than 19 words' leads to contradiction [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / d. Richard's paradox
By diagonalization we can define a real number that isn't in the definable set of reals [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The least ordinal greater than the set of all ordinals is both one of them and not one of them [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / e. Mirimanoff's paradox
The next set up in the hierarchy of sets seems to be both a member and not a member of it [Priest,G]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
If you know that a sentence is not one of the known sentences, you know its truth [Priest,G]
There are Liar Pairs, and Liar Chains, which fit the same pattern as the basic Liar [Priest,G]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / b. Literature
Storytelling is never neutral; some features of the world must be emphasised [Nussbaum]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
The Aristotelian idea that choices can be perceived needs literary texts to expound it [Nussbaum]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Philosophers after Aristotle endorsed the medical analogy for eudaimonia [Nussbaum, by Flanagan]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Particularism gives no guidance for the future [Nussbaum]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Compassion is unreliable, because it favours people close to us [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
Social contracts assume equal powers among the participants [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
We shouldn't focus on actual preferences, which may be distorted by injustices [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
Liberalism does not need a comprehensive account of value [Nussbaum]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Liberals must respect family freedom - but families are the great oppressors of women [Nussbaum]
Women are often treated like children, and not respected for their choices [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Negative liberty is incoherent; all liberties, to do and to be, require the prevention of interference [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
Political freedom is an incoherent project, because some freedoms limit other freedoms [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Political and civil rights are not separate from economic and social rights [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Capabilities: Life, Health, Safety, Mental life, Love, Planning, Joining in, Nature, Play, Control [Nussbaum, by PG]
Justice requires that the ten main capabilities of people are reasonably enabled [Nussbaum]
Capabilities are grounded in bare humanity and agency; qualifying as rational is not needed [Nussbaum]
Rights are not just barriers against state interference; governments must affirm capabilities of citizens [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
Any establishment belief system is incompatible with full respect for all citizens [Nussbaum]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
We should respect animals in the way that we respect the animal nature in humans [Nussbaum]
It may be no harm to kill an animal which cannot plan for its future [Nussbaum]
The Capabilities Approach sees animals as agents, not just as having feelings [Nussbaum]