45 ideas
| 6253 | Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson] |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| 6248 | Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson] |
| 6238 | We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| 6239 | We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson] |
| 6240 | The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson] |
| 6242 | We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson] |
| 6247 | Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson] |
| 6256 | Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson] |
| 6244 | Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson] |
| 6243 | As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson] |
| 6246 | My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson] |
| 6252 | Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson] |
| 6241 | Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson] |
| 6257 | You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson] |
| 6245 | That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson] |
| 6251 | The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| 6254 | We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson] |
| 6255 | Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson] |
| 6250 | We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson] |
| 6249 | If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson] |