104 ideas
16000 | Fixed ideas should be tackled aggressively [Kierkegaard] |
7578 | I conceived it my task to create difficulties everywhere [Kierkegaard] |
22087 | Philosophy fails to articulate the continual becoming of existence [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
22047 | Wherever there is painless contradiction there is also comedy [Kierkegaard] |
18835 | Logic doesn't have a metaphysical basis, but nor can logic give rise to the metaphysics [Rumfitt] |
16012 | Philosophy can't be unbiased if it ignores language, as that is no more independent than individuals are [Kierkegaard] |
18819 | The idea that there are unrecognised truths is basic to our concept of truth [Rumfitt] |
22092 | Kierkegaard's truth draws on authenticity, fidelity and honesty [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
15999 | Pure truth is for infinite beings only; I prefer endless striving for truth [Kierkegaard] |
22094 | Subjective truth can only be sustained by repetition [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
16005 | I recognise knowledge, but it is the truth by which I can live and die that really matters [Kierkegaard] |
5651 | Traditional views of truth are tautologies, and truth is empty without a subject [Kierkegaard, by Scruton] |
20313 | The highest truth we can get is uncertainty held fast by an inward passion [Kierkegaard] |
18826 | 'True at a possibility' means necessarily true if what is said had obtained [Rumfitt] |
18803 | Semantics for propositions: 1) validity preserves truth 2) non-contradition 3) bivalence 4) truth tables [Rumfitt] |
12204 | The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt] |
18814 | 'Absolute necessity' would have to rest on S5 [Rumfitt] |
18798 | It is the second-order part of intuitionistic logic which actually negates some classical theorems [Rumfitt] |
18799 | Intuitionists can accept Double Negation Elimination for decidable propositions [Rumfitt] |
18830 | Most set theorists doubt bivalence for the Continuum Hypothesis, but still use classical logic [Rumfitt] |
18843 | The iterated conception of set requires continual increase in axiom strength [Rumfitt] |
18836 | A set may well not consist of its members; the empty set, for example, is a problem [Rumfitt] |
18837 | A set can be determinate, because of its concept, and still have vague membership [Rumfitt] |
18845 | If the totality of sets is not well-defined, there must be doubt about the Power Set Axiom [Rumfitt] |
11211 | If a sound conclusion comes from two errors that cancel out, the path of the argument must matter [Rumfitt] |
18815 | Logic is higher-order laws which can expand the range of any sort of deduction [Rumfitt] |
9390 | Logic guides thinking, but it isn't a substitute for it [Rumfitt] |
18804 | The case for classical logic rests on its rules, much more than on the Principle of Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
18805 | Classical logic rules cannot be proved, but various lines of attack can be repelled [Rumfitt] |
18827 | If truth-tables specify the connectives, classical logic must rely on Bivalence [Rumfitt] |
12195 | Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt] |
12199 | There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt] |
12201 | We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt] |
18813 | Logical consequence is a relation that can extended into further statements [Rumfitt] |
18808 | Normal deduction presupposes the Cut Law [Rumfitt] |
18840 | When faced with vague statements, Bivalence is not a compelling principle [Rumfitt] |
12194 | Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt] |
11210 | Standardly 'and' and 'but' are held to have the same sense by having the same truth table [Rumfitt] |
18802 | In specifying a logical constant, use of that constant is quite unavoidable [Rumfitt] |
11212 | The sense of a connective comes from primitively obvious rules of inference [Rumfitt] |
12198 | Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt] |
18800 | Introduction rules give deduction conditions, and Elimination says what can be deduced [Rumfitt] |
18809 | Logical truths are just the assumption-free by-products of logical rules [Rumfitt] |
18807 | Monotonicity means there is a guarantee, rather than mere inductive support [Rumfitt] |
18842 | Maybe an ordinal is a property of isomorphic well-ordered sets, and not itself a set [Rumfitt] |
17462 | A single object must not be counted twice, which needs knowledge of distinctness (negative identity) [Rumfitt] |
18834 | Infinitesimals do not stand in a determinate order relation to zero [Rumfitt] |
18846 | Cantor and Dedekind aimed to give analysis a foundation in set theory (rather than geometry) [Rumfitt] |
17461 | Some 'how many?' answers are not predications of a concept, like 'how many gallons?' [Rumfitt] |
16007 | I assume existence, rather than reasoning towards it [Kierkegaard] |
9389 | Vague membership of sets is possible if the set is defined by its concept, not its members [Rumfitt] |
18839 | An object that is not clearly red or orange can still be red-or-orange, which sweeps up problem cases [Rumfitt] |
18838 | The extension of a colour is decided by a concept's place in a network of contraries [Rumfitt] |
16013 | Nothing necessary can come into existence, since it already 'is' [Kierkegaard] |
14532 | A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
18816 | Metaphysical modalities respect the actual identities of things [Rumfitt] |
12193 | Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt] |
12200 | A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt] |
18825 | S5 is the logic of logical necessity [Rumfitt] |
12202 | Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt] |
18824 | Since possibilities are properties of the world, calling 'red' the determination of a determinable seems right [Rumfitt] |
18828 | If two possibilities can't share a determiner, they are incompatible [Rumfitt] |
12203 | If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt] |
18821 | Possibilities are like possible worlds, but not fully determinate or complete [Rumfitt] |
18831 | Medieval logicians said understanding A also involved understanding not-A [Rumfitt] |
18820 | In English 'evidence' is a mass term, qualified by 'little' and 'more' [Rumfitt] |
20742 | The real subject is ethical, not cognitive [Kierkegaard] |
16002 | The self is a combination of pairs of attributes: freedom/necessity, infinite/finite, temporal/eternal [Kierkegaard] |
18817 | We understand conditionals, but disagree over their truth-conditions [Rumfitt] |
18829 | The truth grounds for 'not A' are the possibilities incompatible with truth grounds for A [Rumfitt] |
11214 | We learn 'not' along with affirmation, by learning to either affirm or deny a sentence [Rumfitt] |
22098 | Socrates neglects the gap between knowing what is good and doing good [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
22086 | The most important aspect of a human being is not reason, but passion [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
15998 | Perfect love is not in spite of imperfections; the imperfections must be loved as well [Kierkegaard] |
16003 | If people marry just because they are lonely, that is self-love, not love [Kierkegaard] |
7579 | While big metaphysics is complete without ethics, personal philosophy emphasises ethics [Kierkegaard] |
7581 | Speculative philosophy loses the individual in a vast vision of humanity [Kierkegaard] |
22090 | For me time stands still, and I with it [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
22096 | Anxiety is not a passing mood, but a response to human freedom [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
22097 | The ultimate in life is learning to be anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard] |
21909 | Ultimate knowledge is being anxious in the right way [Kierkegaard] |
20758 | Anxiety is staring into the yawning abyss of freedom [Kierkegaard] |
21910 | Our destiny is the highest pitch of world-weariness [Kierkegaard] |
9305 | The plebeians bore others; only the nobility bore themselves [Kierkegaard] |
5650 | Reason is just abstractions, so our essence needs a subjective 'leap of faith' [Kierkegaard, by Scruton] |
22095 | There are aesthetic, ethical and religious subjectivity [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
20314 | People want to lose themselves in movements and history, instead of being individuals [Kierkegaard] |
7582 | Becoming what one is is a huge difficulty, because we strongly aspire to be something else [Kierkegaard] |
20747 | What matters is not right choice, but energy, earnestness and pathos in the choosing [Kierkegaard] |
16001 | Life may be understood backwards, but it has to be lived forwards [Kierkegaard] |
22093 | Life is a repetition when what has been now becomes [Kierkegaard] |
16009 | When we seek our own 'freedom' we are just trying to avoid responsibility [Kierkegaard] |
22091 | Kierkegaard prioritises the inward individual, rather than community [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
7586 | God does not think or exist; God creates, and is eternal [Kierkegaard] |
16006 | Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard] |
7577 | Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard] |
20312 | God cannot be demonstrated objectively, because God is a subject, only existing inwardly [Kierkegaard] |
7580 | Pantheism destroys the distinction between good and evil [Kierkegaard] |
16008 | The best way to be a Christian is without 'Christianity' [Kierkegaard] |
20735 | We need to see that Christianity cannot be understood [Kierkegaard] |
22088 | Faith is like a dancer's leap, going up to God, but also back to earth [Kierkegaard, by Carlisle] |
7583 | Faith is the highest passion in the sphere of human subjectivity [Kierkegaard] |
7584 | Without risk there is no faith [Kierkegaard] |