Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, JP Burgess / G Rosen and Herbert B. Enderton

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54 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
'True' is only occasionally useful, as in 'everything Fermat believed was true' [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
Modal logic gives an account of metalogical possibility, not metaphysical possibility [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton]
'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton]
'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton]
We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton]
'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
∈ says the whole set is in the other; ⊆ says the members of the subset are in the other [Enderton]
A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton]
A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton]
The 'ordered pair' <x,y> is defined to be {{x}, {x,y}} [Enderton]
A 'linear or total ordering' must be transitive and satisfy trichotomy [Enderton]
The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton]
Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton]
A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton]
A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton]
A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton]
A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton]
A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton]
A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton]
A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton]
A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Note that {Φ} =/= Φ, because Φ ∈ {Φ} but Φ ∉ Φ [Enderton]
The empty set may look pointless, but many sets can be constructed from it [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
The singleton is defined using the pairing axiom (as {x,x}) [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton]
We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
Fraenkel added Replacement, to give a theory of ordinal numbers [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
We can only define functions if Choice tells us which items are involved [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
The paradoxes are only a problem for Frege; Cantor didn't assume every condition determines a set [Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology implies that acceptance of entities entails acceptance of conglomerates [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
A relation is either a set of sets of sets, or a set of sets [Burgess/Rosen]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / a. Set theory paradoxes
The paradoxes no longer seem crucial in critiques of set theory [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We should talk about possible existence, rather than actual existence, of numbers [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Structuralism and nominalism are normally rivals, but might work together [Burgess/Rosen]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Number words became nouns around the time of Plato [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
Abstract/concrete is a distinction of kind, not degree [Burgess/Rosen]
Much of what science says about concrete entities is 'abstraction-laden' [Burgess/Rosen]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / b. Levels of abstraction
Mathematics has ascended to higher and higher levels of abstraction [Burgess/Rosen]
Abstraction is on a scale, of sets, to attributes, to type-formulas, to token-formulas [Burgess/Rosen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
The old debate classified representations as abstract, not entities [Burgess/Rosen]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
If space is really just a force-field, then it is a physical entity [Burgess/Rosen]