Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Jean Buridan and Fred Dretske

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25 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1403 A rational donkey would starve to death between two totally identical piles of hay [Buridan, by PG]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
16678 Without magnitude a thing would retain its parts, but they would have no location [Buridan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
16793 A thing is (less properly) the same over time if each part is succeeded by another [Buridan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
5806 Belief is the power of metarepresentation [Dretske]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / f. Animal beliefs
5801 A mouse hearing a piano played does not believe it, because it lacks concepts and understanding [Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
16726 Why can't we deduce secondary qualities from primary ones, if they cause them? [Buridan]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
6445 You have knowledge if you can rule out all the relevant alternatives to what you believe [Dretske, by DeRose]
19544 Closure says if you know P, and also know P implies Q, then you must know Q [Dretske]
19545 We needn't regret the implications of our regrets; regretting drinking too much implies the past is real [Dretske]
19547 Reasons for believing P may not transmit to its implication, Q [Dretske]
19546 Knowing by visual perception is not the same as knowing by implication [Dretske]
19548 The only way to preserve our homely truths is to abandon closure [Dretske]
19549 P may imply Q, but evidence for P doesn't imply evidence for Q, so closure fails [Dretske]
19550 We know past events by memory, but we don't know the past is real (an implication) by memory [Dretske]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
16577 Induction is not demonstration, because not all of the instances can be observed [Buridan]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
16576 Science is based on induction, for general truths about fire, rhubarb and magnets [Buridan]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
5802 Representations are in the head, but their content is not, as stories don't exist in their books [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
5809 Some activities are performed better without consciousness of them [Dretske]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
5808 Qualia are just the properties objects are represented as having [Dretske]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5803 In a representational theory of mind, introspection is displaced perception [Dretske]
5807 Introspection is the same as the experience one is introspecting [Dretske]
5805 Introspection does not involve looking inwards [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
5804 A representational theory of the mind is an externalist theory of the mind [Dretske]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
5800 All mental facts are representation, which consists of informational functions [Dretske]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
6005 Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]