123 ideas
16440 | I don't think Lewis's cost-benefit reflective equilibrium approach offers enough guidance [Stalnaker] |
7113 | Phenomenology assumes that all consciousness is of something [Sartre] |
16468 | Non-S5 can talk of contingent or necessary necessities [Stalnaker] |
18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
16449 | In modal set theory, sets only exist in a possible world if that world contains all of its members [Stalnaker] |
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
16464 | We regiment to get semantic structure, for evaluating arguments, and understanding complexities [Stalnaker] |
16465 | In 'S was F or some other than S was F', the disjuncts need S, but the whole disjunction doesn't [Stalnaker] |
16405 | To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker] |
16434 | Some say what exists must do so, and nothing else could possible exist [Stalnaker] |
16439 | A nominalist view says existence is having spatio-temporal location [Stalnaker] |
22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
16443 | Properties are modal, involving possible situations where they are exemplified [Stalnaker] |
16471 | I accept a hierarchy of properties of properties of properties [Stalnaker] |
16452 | Dispositions have modal properties, of which properties things would have counterfactually [Stalnaker] |
14617 | Predicates can't apply to what doesn't exist [Stalnaker] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
16407 | Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
16467 | 'Socrates is essentially human' seems to say nothing could be Socrates if it was not human [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
16453 | The bundle theory makes the identity of indiscernibles a necessity, since the thing is the properties [Stalnaker] |
16466 | Strong necessity is always true; weak necessity is cannot be false [Stalnaker] |
14286 | In nearby worlds where A is true, 'if A,B' is true or false if B is true or false [Stalnaker] |
10994 | Conditionals are true if minimal revision of the antecedent verifies the consequent [Stalnaker, by Read] |
16438 | Necessity and possibility are fundamental, and there can be no reductive analysis of them [Stalnaker] |
16422 | The necessity of a proposition concerns reality, not our words or concepts [Stalnaker] |
16423 | Conceptual possibilities are metaphysical possibilities we can conceive of [Stalnaker] |
16436 | Modal concepts are central to the actual world, and shouldn't need extravagant metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16421 | Critics say there are just an a priori necessary part, and an a posteriori contingent part [Stalnaker] |
16429 | A 'centred' world is an ordered triple of world, individual and time [Stalnaker] |
16397 | If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker] |
16399 | Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker] |
16398 | Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker] |
16433 | Given actualism, how can there be possible individuals, other than the actual ones? [Stalnaker] |
14285 | A possible world is the ontological analogue of hypothetical beliefs [Stalnaker] |
15793 | We can take 'ways things might have been' as irreducible elements in our ontology [Stalnaker, by Lycan] |
16396 | Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker] |
16437 | Possible worlds are properties [Stalnaker] |
16444 | Possible worlds don't reduce modality, they regiment it to reveal its structure [Stalnaker] |
16445 | I think of worlds as cells (rather than points) in logical space [Stalnaker] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
16408 | Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker] |
16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
16454 | Modal properties depend on the choice of a counterpart, which is unconstrained by metaphysics [Stalnaker] |
16450 | Anti-haecceitism says there is no more to an individual than meeting some qualitative conditions [Stalnaker] |
7112 | The Cogito depends on a second-order experience, of being conscious of consciousness [Sartre] |
7114 | The consciousness that says 'I think' is not the consciousness that thinks [Sartre] |
7119 | Is the Cogito reporting an immediate experience of doubting, or the whole enterprise of doubting? [Sartre] |
20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
7122 | We can never, even in principle, grasp other minds, because the Ego is self-conceiving [Sartre] |
7125 | A consciousness can conceive of no other consciousness than itself [Sartre] |
7108 | The eternal truth of 2+2=4 is what gives unity to the mind which regularly thinks it [Sartre] |
24016 | Consciousness always transcends itself [Sartre] |
6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
7111 | Consciousness exists as consciousness of itself [Sartre] |
22226 | Since we are a consciousness, Sartre entirely rejected the unconscious mind [Sartre, by Daigle] |
7107 | Intentionality defines, transcends and unites consciousness [Sartre] |
3847 | Man is nothing else but the sum of his actions [Sartre] |
7109 | If you think of '2+2=4' as the content of thought, the self must be united transcendentally [Sartre] |
7106 | The Ego is not formally or materially part of consciousness, but is outside in the world [Sartre] |
7117 | How could two I's, the reflective and the reflected, communicate with each other? [Sartre] |
7123 | Knowing yourself requires an exterior viewpoint, which is necessarily false [Sartre] |
22225 | My ego is more intimate to me, but not more certain than other egos [Sartre] |
7124 | The Ego never appears except when we are not looking for it [Sartre] |
7116 | When we are unreflective (as when chasing a tram) there is no 'I' [Sartre] |
7120 | It is theoretically possible that the Ego consists entirely of false memories [Sartre] |
7110 | If the 'I' is transcendental, it unnecessarily splits consciousness in two [Sartre] |
7115 | Maybe it is the act of reflection that brings 'me' into existence [Sartre] |
7121 | The Ego only appears to reflection, so it is cut off from the World [Sartre] |
3846 | Man IS freedom [Sartre] |
24013 | An emotion and its object form a unity, so emotion is a mode of apprehension [Sartre] |
24017 | Emotion is one of our modes of understanding our Being-in-the-World [Sartre] |
24014 | Emotions are a sort of bodily incantation which brings a magic to the world [Sartre] |
24015 | Emotions makes us believe in and live in a new world [Sartre] |
6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
16428 | Meanings aren't in the head, but that is because they are abstract [Stalnaker] |
16474 | How can we know what we are thinking, if content depends on something we don't know? [Stalnaker] |
16406 | If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker] |
16404 | In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker] |
16432 | One view says the causal story is built into the description that is the name's content [Stalnaker] |
16403 | 'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker] |
16461 | We still lack an agreed semantics for quantifiers in natural language [Stalnaker] |
16401 | To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker] |
16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |
16448 | Possible world semantics may not reduce modality, but it can explain it [Stalnaker] |
16430 | Two-D says that a posteriori is primary and contingent, and the necessity is the secondary intension [Stalnaker] |
16431 | In one view, the secondary intension is metasemantic, about how the thinker relates to the content [Stalnaker] |
16442 | I take propositions to be truth conditions [Stalnaker] |
16447 | A theory of propositions at least needs primitive properties of consistency and of truth [Stalnaker] |
14616 | A 'Russellian proposition' is an ordered sequence of individual, properties and relations [Stalnaker] |
16446 | Propositions presumably don't exist if the things they refer to don't exist [Stalnaker] |
18052 | An assertion aims to add to the content of a context [Stalnaker, by Magidor] |
14718 | An assertion is an attempt to rule out certain possibilities, narrowing things down for good planning [Stalnaker, by Schroeter] |
6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
3843 | There is no human nature [Sartre] |
20762 | There are no values to justify us, and no excuses [Sartre] |
3852 | If values depend on us, freedom is the foundation of all values [Sartre] |
22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
20764 | In becoming what we want to be we create what we think man ought to be [Sartre] |
3848 | Cowards are responsible for their cowardice [Sartre] |
20763 | When my personal freedom becomes involved, I must want freedom for everyone else [Sartre] |
22229 | Existentialists says that cowards and heroes make themselves [Sartre] |
20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
3842 | Existence before essence (or begin with the subjective) [Sartre] |
6868 | 'Existence precedes essence' means we have no pre-existing self, but create it through existence [Sartre, by Le Poidevin] |
3844 | Existentialism says man is whatever he makes of himself [Sartre] |
20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |
20754 | It is dishonest to offer passions as an excuse [Sartre] |
22230 | Sartre gradually realised that freedom is curtailed by the weight of situation [Sartre, by Daigle] |
22232 | Authenticity is taking responsibility for a situation, with all its risks and emotions [Sartre] |
3851 | If I do not choose, that is still a choice [Sartre] |
6571 | When a man must choose between his mother and the Resistance, no theory can help [Sartre, by Fogelin] |
20491 | States have a monopoly of legitimate violence [Sartre, by Wolff,J] |
21240 | The truth about events always comes from the oppressed and disadvantaged [Sartre, by Bakewell] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
3845 | Without God there is no intelligibility or value [Sartre] |