466 ideas
18495 | The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil] |
16281 | Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense [Lewis] |
18494 | Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil] |
18506 | Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil] |
18535 | Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil] |
21461 | I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views [Lewis] |
16288 | Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge) [Lewis] |
15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
8605 | In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis] |
7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
15457 | Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both [Lewis] |
15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
18534 | Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil] |
10845 | To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive [Lewis] |
9651 | Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact [Lewis] |
15557 | Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis] |
18531 | Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil] |
10847 | Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth [Lewis] |
18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
15549 | If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker? [Lewis] |
14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
10846 | Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one [Lewis] |
16456 | For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
18395 | Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong] |
10807 | Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function [Lewis] |
15496 | We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis] |
15500 | Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis] |
15499 | A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis] |
15498 | We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis] |
15502 | There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis] |
15503 | We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis] |
10809 | We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members [Lewis] |
10812 | The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality [Lewis] |
10811 | The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence [Lewis] |
15497 | We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis] |
15506 | If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis] |
15511 | If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis] |
15513 | Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis] |
10813 | What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element? [Lewis] |
10814 | Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates? [Lewis] |
15507 | Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis] |
10191 | Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride] |
15508 | If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis] |
15514 | A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis] |
15523 | Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis] |
7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
10806 | Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology [Lewis] |
10816 | We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations [Lewis] |
15533 | We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis] |
15731 | Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes') [Lewis] |
15525 | Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis] |
15518 | I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis] |
15534 | We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties [Lewis] |
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
18518 | Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil] |
10808 | Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions [Lewis] |
15524 | Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis] |
15517 | Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis] |
15515 | To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis] |
10815 | We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions [Lewis] |
18500 | How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil] |
15532 | 'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones [Lewis] |
15789 | Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting' [Lycan on Lewis] |
15535 | We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist [Lewis] |
10470 | There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars) [Lewis, by Oliver] |
15520 | Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis] |
14401 | Every proposition is entirely about being [Lewis] |
15540 | You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
8607 | Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis] |
7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
9650 | Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion [Lewis] |
3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
8606 | A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis] |
16210 | Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time [Lewis] |
15501 | We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis] |
15504 | Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis] |
7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
8580 | Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis] |
8909 | Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object [Lewis] |
15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
9057 | Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express [Lewis] |
9671 | Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision [Lewis] |
16458 | Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language [Lewis] |
15538 | Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis] |
18505 | Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil] |
18499 | Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil] |
18512 | Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil] |
7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
21339 | We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil] |
21349 | Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil] |
21340 | Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil] |
18508 | Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil] |
21351 | Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil] |
21344 | If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil] |
21348 | In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil] |
18532 | If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil] |
15751 | Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed? [Lewis] |
8571 | Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis] |
15735 | Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them [Lewis] |
9656 | The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy [Lewis] |
15737 | To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role [Lewis] |
18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
14979 | Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
15454 | Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling' [Lewis] |
15742 | A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic [Lewis] |
15741 | All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties [Lewis] |
15398 | Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15397 | If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic [Cameron on Lewis] |
15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
15400 | We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15458 | A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates [Lewis] |
15459 | Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects [Lewis] |
10717 | Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver] |
15752 | We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them [Lewis] |
16217 | Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley] |
8585 | Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis] |
8613 | Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis] |
8586 | Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis] |
8589 | For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis] |
15460 | All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis] |
15726 | Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis] |
14996 | Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity... [Lewis] |
15744 | We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance [Lewis] |
15743 | Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular [Lewis] |
15740 | I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world [Lewis] |
16262 | Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness [Lewis, by Maudlin] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
7031 | Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil] |
8572 | Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis] |
15464 | The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion [Lewis] |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
18522 | Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil] |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
18513 | Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil] |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
18433 | There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis] |
8604 | We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis] |
18540 | Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil] |
15739 | There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
18533 | In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil] |
15516 | A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis] |
18511 | Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil] |
10723 | A property is the set of its actual and possible instances [Lewis, by Oliver] |
14499 | Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki] |
4038 | Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate') [Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver] |
15399 | The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F [Lewis, by Cameron] |
15732 | Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set [Lewis] |
15733 | Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances [Lewis] |
15734 | If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too [Lewis] |
9655 | Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds [Lewis] |
16290 | I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals [Lewis] |
9653 | It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances [Lewis] |
9657 | You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
15749 | Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis] |
15750 | Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis] |
15748 | Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis] |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
9476 | If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them [Bird on Lewis] |
15463 | All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis] |
15120 | Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne] |
15554 | A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis] |
7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
21350 | If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil] |
18523 | Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil] |
18524 | Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil] |
7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
15461 | A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs [Lewis] |
8573 | Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis] |
8569 | I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis] |
15745 | Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis] |
15453 | The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis] |
15746 | If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis] |
15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
21961 | Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW] |
7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
15747 | Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be [Lewis] |
7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
8576 | The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
8570 | To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis] |
8574 | Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis] |
7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
15455 | Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is [Lewis] |
18507 | Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil] |
7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
15537 | If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis] |
7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
15536 | We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis] |
15452 | We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis] |
15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
14748 | The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis] |
6129 | Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks] |
18515 | Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil] |
18516 | A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
15519 | Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis] |
15521 | Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis] |
15522 | The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis] |
15512 | In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis] |
10566 | Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K] |
9667 | Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum [Lewis] |
13268 | There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague [Lewis, by Sider] |
15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
14244 | Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis] |
10660 | A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis] |
10810 | I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion [Lewis] |
18514 | Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil] |
18517 | Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil] |
11976 | Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis] |
13793 | An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts [Lewis, by Elder] |
9663 | A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times [Lewis] |
14737 | Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic [Lewis, by Sider] |
9664 | Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape [Lewis] |
9665 | There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure [Lewis] |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
19280 | I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential [Lewis] |
15968 | Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing [Lewis] |
15969 | Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem [Lewis] |
16079 | De re modal predicates are ambiguous [Lewis, by Rudder Baker] |
11978 | Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis] |
15560 | We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis] |
14283 | A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition [Lewis, by Edgington] |
14361 | Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional [Lewis, by Jackson] |
8434 | In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true [Lewis, by Horwich] |
8425 | For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality [Lewis] |
15462 | Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents [Lewis] |
18502 | If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil] |
9660 | The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague [Lewis] |
9669 | There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties [Lewis] |
16132 | On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported [Lewis] |
16133 | Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions [Lewis] |
12255 | For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual [Oderberg on Lewis] |
9219 | Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets [Lewis, by Sider] |
16283 | For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself [Lewis] |
15022 | If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality [Sider on Lewis] |
10469 | A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things [Lewis] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
15790 | Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible [Lycan on Lewis] |
15791 | What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds? [Lycan on Lewis] |
16441 | Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets [Lewis, by Stalnaker] |
16282 | Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been [Lewis] |
18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
16284 | Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically [Lewis] |
16286 | Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing [Lewis] |
16287 | Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together [Lewis] |
9662 | Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary [Lewis] |
7690 | If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual [Jacquette on Lewis] |
11979 | It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis] |
15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
16994 | Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis] |
11974 | Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis] |
11975 | If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis] |
11977 | Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis] |
14404 | The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way [Lewis, by Merricks] |
5441 | Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me? [Mautner on Lewis] |
5440 | A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else [Lewis, by Mautner] |
16291 | In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings [Lewis] |
11903 | Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider [Lewis, by Mackie,P] |
15129 | Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity [Lewis] |
9670 | Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg [Lewis] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
12899 | The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer [Lewis] |
12897 | To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction [Lewis] |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
15509 | Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis] |
7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
12898 | Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge [Lewis] |
16279 | General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis] |
12895 | Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
19562 | We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context [Lewis, by Cohen,S] |
7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
9661 | Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed [Lewis] |
9652 | To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable [Lewis] |
15559 | Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis] |
15556 | Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis] |
15558 | A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis] |
9658 | An explanation tells us how an event was caused [Lewis] |
4809 | Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos] |
16280 | Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories [Lewis] |
14321 | To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis] |
7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
16274 | If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising [Lewis] |
3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
8209 | Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible [Lewis] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
8424 | Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ [Lewis] |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
7441 | Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states [Lewis] |
7442 | 'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain [Lewis] |
7444 | Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain [Lewis] |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
7445 | The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent [Lewis] |
8579 | Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis] |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
7443 | A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia [Lewis, by PG] |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
8901 | Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively [Lewis] |
8904 | The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction [Lewis] |
8938 | The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers? [Lewis] |
8903 | Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets [Lewis] |
8902 | If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations [Lewis] |
8906 | If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes [Lewis] |
8905 | If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts [Lewis] |
8908 | For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction [Lewis] |
8907 | The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it [Lewis] |
15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |
16289 | We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist [Lewis] |
7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
16278 | A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought [Lewis] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
18536 | The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil] |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
8420 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true [Lewis] |
9654 | A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property [Lewis] |
15736 | A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true [Lewis] |
15738 | Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds [Lewis] |
7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
8615 | We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis] |
8614 | A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis] |
15539 | Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis] |
18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
15555 | Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis] |
8427 | I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted [Lewis] |
8433 | There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich] |
8405 | A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted [Lewis, by Field,H] |
18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
15551 | Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis] |
10392 | It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause [Lewis] |
8419 | The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions [Lewis] |
15552 | We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis] |
18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
8421 | Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted [Lewis] |
7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
17524 | Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption) [Lewis, by Bird] |
8397 | Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't [Tooley on Lewis] |
8423 | My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations [Lewis] |
8426 | One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second [Lewis] |
15553 | Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis] |
8608 | Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis] |
8584 | Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis] |
9659 | Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either [Lewis] |
17525 | The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects [Lewis, by Bird] |
15727 | Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis] |
8581 | Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis] |
9423 | If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element [Mumford on Lewis] |
9424 | A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system [Mumford on Lewis] |
9419 | A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength [Lewis] |
9425 | Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few) [Mumford on Lewis] |
8611 | A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis] |
9409 | Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts [Lewis, by Mumford] |
4398 | An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first [Lewis, by Psillos] |
4795 | Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter [Cohen,LJ on Lewis] |
9426 | The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact [Lewis] |
18520 | Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil] |
9666 | It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything [Lewis] |
23019 | The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
23021 | Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers [Lewis, by Baron/Miller] |
18501 | Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil] |
7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |