148 ideas
18495 | The best philosophers I know are the best people I know [Heil] |
18494 | Using a technical vocabulary actually prevents discussion of the presuppositions [Heil] |
18506 | Questions of explanation should not be confused with metaphyics [Heil] |
18535 | Without abstraction we couldn't think systematically [Heil] |
7001 | If you begin philosophy with language, you find yourself trapped in it [Heil] |
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
7038 | A theory with few fundamental principles might still posit a lot of entities [Heil] |
7037 | Parsimony does not imply the world is simple, but that our theories should try to be [Heil] |
18534 | Truth relates truthbearers to truthmakers [Heil] |
18531 | Philosophers of the past took the truthmaking idea for granted [Heil] |
18509 | Not all truths need truthmakers - mathematics and logic seem to be just true [Heil] |
7004 | The view that truth making is entailment is misguided and misleading [Heil] |
7035 | God does not create the world, and then add the classes [Heil] |
18518 | Infinite numbers are qualitatively different - they are not just very large numbers [Heil] |
18500 | How could structures be mathematical truthmakers? Maths is just true, without truthmakers [Heil] |
7017 | The reductionist programme dispenses with levels of reality [Heil] |
18539 | Our categories lack the neat arrangement needed for reduction [Heil] |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
7003 | There are levels of organisation, complexity, description and explanation, but not of reality [Heil] |
7045 | Realism says some of our concepts 'cut nature at the joints' [Heil] |
7065 | Anti-realists who reduce reality to language must explain the existence of language [Heil] |
18505 | Fundamental ontology aims at the preconditions for any true theory [Heil] |
18499 | Our quantifications only reveal the truths we accept; the ontology and truthmakers are another matter [Heil] |
18512 | Ontology aims to give the fundamental categories of being [Heil] |
7020 | Concepts don't carve up the world, which has endless overlooked or ignored divisions [Heil] |
21339 | We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil] |
21349 | Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil] |
21340 | Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil] |
18508 | Most philosophers now (absurdly) believe that relations fully exist [Heil] |
21348 | In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil] |
21351 | Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil] |
21344 | If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil] |
18532 | If causal relations are power manifestations, that makes them internal relations [Heil] |
18510 | We need properties to explain how the world works [Heil] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
18522 | Categorical properties were introduced by philosophers as actual properties, not if-then properties [Heil] |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
18513 | Emergent properties will need emergent substances to bear them [Heil] |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
7007 | I think of properties as simultaneously dispositional and qualitative [Heil] |
18540 | Predicates only match properties at the level of fundamentals [Heil] |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
7015 | A predicate applies truly if it picks out a real property of objects [Heil] |
18533 | In Fa, F may not be a property of a, but a determinable, satisfied by some determinate [Heil] |
18511 | Properties have causal roles which sets can't possibly have [Heil] |
7042 | A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil] |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
7023 | Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil] |
21350 | If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil] |
18523 | Are all properties powers, or are there also qualities, or do qualities have the powers? [Heil] |
18524 | Properties are both qualitative and dispositional - they are powerful qualities [Heil] |
7025 | Are a property's dispositions built in, or contingently added? [Heil] |
7034 | Universals explain one-over-many relations, and similar qualities, and similar behaviour [Heil] |
7039 | How could you tell if the universals were missing from a world of instances? [Heil] |
7009 | Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for [Heil] |
7041 | Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar [Heil] |
7032 | Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil] |
7008 | Trope theorists usually see objects as 'bundles' of tropes [Heil] |
7018 | Objects are substances, which are objects considered as the bearer of properties [Heil] |
18498 | Abstract objects wouldn't be very popular without the implicit idea of truthmakers [Heil] |
18507 | Substances bear properties, so must be simple, and not consist of further substances [Heil] |
7019 | Maybe there is only one substance, space-time or a quantum field [Heil] |
7046 | Rather than 'substance' I use 'objects', which have properties [Heil] |
7047 | Statues and bronze lumps have discernible differences, so can't be identical [Heil] |
7048 | Do we reduce statues to bronze, or eliminate statues, or allow statues and bronze? [Heil] |
18515 | Spatial parts are just regions, but objects depend on and are made up of substantial parts [Heil] |
18516 | A 'gunky' universe would literally have no parts at all [Heil] |
18514 | Many wholes can survive replacement of their parts [Heil] |
18517 | Dunes depend on sand grains, but line segments depend on the whole line [Heil] |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
18502 | If basic physics has natures, then why not reality itself? That would then found the deepest necessities [Heil] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
18496 | If possible worlds are just fictions, they can't be truthmakers for modal judgements [Heil] |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
7030 | Properties don't possess ways they are, because that just is the property [Heil] |
7028 | If properties were qualities without dispositions, they would be undetectable [Heil] |
7029 | Can we distinguish the way a property is from the property? [Heil] |
7051 | Objects only have secondary qualities because they have primary qualities [Heil] |
7044 | Secondary qualities are just primary qualities considered in the light of their effect on us [Heil] |
7052 | Colours aren't surface properties, because of radiant sources and the colour of the sky [Heil] |
7053 | Treating colour as light radiation has the implausible result that tomatoes are not red [Heil] |
7066 | If the world is just texts or social constructs, what are texts and social constructs? [Heil] |
7021 | If the world is theory-dependent, the theories themselves can't be theory-dependent [Heil] |
7026 | Science is sometimes said to classify powers, neglecting qualities [Heil] |
7060 | One form of explanation is by decomposition [Heil] |
2534 | Mindless bodies are zombies, bodiless minds are ghosts [Sturgeon] |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
2537 | Types are properties, and tokens are events. Are they split between mental and physical, or not? [Sturgeon] |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
7010 | Dispositionality provides the grounding for intentionality [Heil] |
7054 | Intentionality now has internalist (intrinsic to thinkers) and externalist (environment or community) views [Heil] |
2532 | Intentionality isn't reducible, because of its experiential aspect [Sturgeon] |
7011 | Qualia are not extra appendages, but intrinsic ingredients of material states and processes [Heil] |
18525 | Mental abstraction does not make what is abstracted mind-dependent [Heil] |
18504 | Only particulars exist, and generality is our mode of presentation [Heil] |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
7061 | Philosophers' zombies aim to show consciousness is over and above the physical world [Heil] |
7063 | Zombies are based on the idea that consciousness relates contingently to the physical [Heil] |
7064 | Functionalists deny zombies, since identity of functional state means identity of mental state [Heil] |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
7027 | Functionalists say objects can be the same in disposition but differ in quality [Heil] |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
7062 | Functionalism cannot explain consciousness just by functional organisation [Heil] |
2533 | Rule-following can't be reduced to the physical [Sturgeon] |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
7059 | The 'explanatory gap' is used to say consciousness is inexplicable, at least with current concepts [Heil] |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
7012 | If a car is a higher-level entity, distinct from its parts, how could it ever do anything? [Heil] |
2535 | The main argument for physicalism is its simple account of causation [Sturgeon] |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
7043 | Multiple realisability is actually one predicate applying to a diverse range of properties [Heil] |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
18503 | You can think of tomatoes without grasping what they are [Heil] |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
18537 | Linguistic thought is just as imagistic as non-linguistic thought [Heil] |
18538 | Non-conscious thought may be unlike conscious thought [Heil] |
7058 | Externalism is causal-historical, or social, or biological [Heil] |
7057 | Intentionality is based in dispositions, which are intrinsic to agents, suggesting internalism [Heil] |
2536 | Do facts cause thoughts, or embody them, or what? [Sturgeon] |
7013 | The Picture Theory claims we can read reality from our ways of speaking about it [Heil] |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
18536 | The subject-predicate form reflects reality [Heil] |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
7002 | If propositions are states of affairs or sets of possible worlds, these lack truth values [Heil] |
18497 | Many reject 'moral realism' because they can't see any truthmakers for normative judgements [Heil] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
18519 | If there were infinite electrons, they could vanish without affecting total mass-energy [Heil] |
18526 | We should focus on actual causings, rather than on laws and causal sequences [Heil] |
18527 | Probabilistic causation is not a weak type of cause; it is just a probability of there being a cause [Heil] |
7016 | The standard view is that causal sequences are backed by laws, and between particular events [Heil] |
18520 | Electrons are treated as particles, but they lose their individuality in relations [Heil] |
18501 | Maybe the universe is fine-tuned because it had to be, despite plans by God or Nature? [Heil] |
7036 | The real natural properties are sparse, but there are many complex properties [Heil] |