40 ideas
| 12585 | Most people can't even define a chair [Peacocke] |
| 10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
| 10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
| 10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
| 10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
| 10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
| 10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
| 10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
| 10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
| 10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
| 10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
| 10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
| 10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
| 10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
| 10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
| 10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
| 10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
| 10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
| 10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
| 12581 | Perceptual concepts causally influence the content of our experiences [Peacocke] |
| 12579 | Perception has proto-propositions, between immediate experience and concepts [Peacocke] |
| 12586 | Consciousness of a belief isn't a belief that one has it [Peacocke] |
| 12608 | Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke] |
| 18568 | Philosophy should merely give necessary and sufficient conditions for concept possession [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18571 | Peacocke's account of possession of a concept depends on one view of counterfactuals [Peacocke, by Machery] |
| 18572 | Peacocke's account separates psychology from philosophy, and is very sketchy [Machery on Peacocke] |
| 17722 | The concept 'red' is tied to what actually individuates red things [Peacocke] |
| 11127 | If concepts just are mental representations, what of concepts we may never acquire? [Peacocke] |
| 12577 | Possessing a concept is being able to make judgements which use it [Peacocke] |
| 12578 | A concept is just what it is to possess that concept [Peacocke] |
| 12587 | Employing a concept isn't decided by introspection, but by making judgements using it [Peacocke] |
| 12605 | A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke] |
| 12607 | Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke] |
| 12609 | Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke] |
| 12584 | An analysis of concepts must link them to something unconceptualized [Peacocke] |
| 12604 | Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke] |
| 9335 | Concepts are constituted by their role in a group of propositions to which we are committed [Peacocke, by Greco] |
| 9336 | A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich] |
| 12610 | Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |