26 ideas
14025 | The weaker version of Truthmaker: 'truth supervenes on being' [Crisp,TM] |
14023 | The Truthmaker thesis spells trouble for presentists [Crisp,TM] |
14024 | Truthmaker has problems with generalisation, non-existence claims, and property instantiations [Crisp,TM] |
10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
14021 | Worm Perdurantism has a fusion of all the parts; Stage Perdurantism has one part at a time [Crisp,TM] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
14020 | 'Eternalism' is the thesis that reality includes past, present and future entities [Crisp,TM] |
14026 | Presentists can talk of 'times', with no more commitment than modalists have to possible worlds [Crisp,TM] |
14022 | The only three theories are Presentism, Dynamic (A-series) Eternalism and Static (B-series) Eternalism [Crisp,TM] |