32 ideas
| 22358 | Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper] |
| 11946 | Propensities are part of a situation, not part of the objects [Popper] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 17368 | Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt] |
| 17370 | Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt] |
| 12177 | Human artefacts may have essences, in their purposes [Popper] |
| 5451 | Popper felt that ancient essentialism was a bar to progress [Popper, by Mautner] |
| 9354 | Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt] |
| 19565 | How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt] |
| 9353 | We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt] |
| 9356 | The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt] |
| 19564 | Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt] |
| 22188 | Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper] |
| 18284 | Particulars can be verified or falsified, but general statements can only be falsified (conclusively) [Popper] |
| 7780 | Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee] |
| 16830 | We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper] |
| 6794 | If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper] |
| 6795 | When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper] |
| 3856 | Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith] |
| 7779 | There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee] |
| 3860 | Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper] |
| 12176 | Science does not aim at ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| 17371 | Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt] |
| 12175 | Galilean science aimed at true essences, as the ultimate explanations [Popper] |
| 12179 | Essentialist views of science prevent further questions from being raised [Popper] |
| 17369 | We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt] |
| 17367 | Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG] |
| 17372 | The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt] |
| 17373 | Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt] |