161 ideas
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
9738 | Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9727 | Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9726 | We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9737 | The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13136 | The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13727 | A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9734 | Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9736 | A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9735 | A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9741 | Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13149 | S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13141 | Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13138 | Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13142 | Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13144 | T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13145 | D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13146 | B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13147 | 4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13148 | 4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9740 | If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9739 | If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13137 | Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13140 | Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13139 | Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13143 | Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9742 | The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13114 | □P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9743 | The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9744 | The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9746 | The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9745 | The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9747 | The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9748 | System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9404 | Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13112 | In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13111 | Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13113 | F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13728 | The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13729 | The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
9725 | 'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
13730 | The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13725 | □ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13731 | Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
13726 | Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |