Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Max J. Cresswell and Jonathan Kvanvig

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
14970 Normal system K has five axioms and rules [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
14971 D is valid on every serial frame, but not where there are dead ends [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
14972 S4 has 14 modalities, and always reduces to a maximum of three modal operators [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
14973 In S5 all the long complex modalities reduce to just three, and their negations [Cresswell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
14976 Reject the Barcan if quantifiers are confined to worlds, and different things exist in other worlds [Cresswell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
14974 A relation is 'Euclidean' if aRb and aRc imply bRc [Cresswell]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14975 A de dicto necessity is true in all worlds, but not necessarily of the same thing in each world [Cresswell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
19566 Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
19261 Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
19568 Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
19567 The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
19679 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 1. Epistemic virtues
19730 Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig]
19731 If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig]
19732 The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
19678 Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
19570 Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
6005 Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]