31 ideas
4739 | In "if and only if" (iff), "if" expresses the sufficient condition, and "only if" the necessary condition [Engel] |
4737 | Are truth-bearers propositions, or ideas/beliefs, or sentences/utterances? [Engel] |
4750 | The redundancy theory gets rid of facts, for 'it is a fact that p' just means 'p' [Engel] |
4744 | We can't explain the corresponding structure of the world except by referring to our thoughts [Engel] |
4738 | The coherence theory says truth is an internal relationship between groups of truth-bearers [Engel] |
4745 | Any coherent set of beliefs can be made more coherent by adding some false beliefs [Engel] |
4753 | Deflationism seems to block philosophers' main occupation, asking metatheoretical questions [Engel] |
4755 | Deflationism cannot explain why we hold beliefs for reasons [Engel] |
4751 | Maybe there is no more to be said about 'true' than there is about the function of 'and' in logic [Engel] |
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
4752 | Deflationism must reduce bivalence ('p is true or false') to excluded middle ('p or not-p') [Engel] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
4762 | The Humean theory of motivation is that beliefs may be motivators as well as desires [Engel] |
4754 | Our beliefs are meant to fit the world (i.e. be true), where we want the world to fit our desires [Engel] |
4763 | 'Evidentialists' say, and 'voluntarists' deny, that we only believe on the basis of evidence [Engel] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
4746 | Pragmatism is better understood as a theory of belief than as a theory of truth [Engel] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
4764 | We cannot directly control our beliefs, but we can control the causes of our involuntary beliefs [Engel] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
4759 | Mental states as functions are second-order properties, realised by first-order physical properties [Engel] |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |