51 ideas
9331 | How do we determine which of the sentences containing a term comprise its definition? [Horwich] |
6334 | The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich] |
6342 | Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich] |
6332 | The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich] |
6335 | The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich] |
6344 | Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich] |
6336 | No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich] |
23299 | Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson] |
6337 | The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich] |
6339 | Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich] |
8431 | Problems with Goodman's view of counterfactuals led to a radical approach from Stalnaker and Lewis [Horwich] |
9333 | A priori belief is not necessarily a priori justification, or a priori knowledge [Horwich] |
9342 | Understanding needs a priori commitment [Horwich] |
9332 | Meaning is generated by a priori commitment to truth, not the other way around [Horwich] |
9341 | Meanings and concepts cannot give a priori knowledge, because they may be unacceptable [Horwich] |
9334 | If we stipulate the meaning of 'number' to make Hume's Principle true, we first need Hume's Principle [Horwich] |
9339 | A priori knowledge (e.g. classical logic) may derive from the innate structure of our minds [Horwich] |
2799 | Bayes' theorem explains why very surprising predictions have a higher value as evidence [Horwich] |
2798 | Probability of H, given evidence E, is prob(H) x prob(E given H) / prob(E) [Horwich] |
6338 | We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich] |
6340 | There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich] |
6341 | Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich] |
22849 | Rawls's theory cannot justify liberalism, since it presupposes free and equal participants [Charvet] |
22848 | People with strong prior beliefs would have nothing to do with a veil of ignorance [Charvet] |
22838 | Societies need shared values, so conservatism is right if rational discussion of values is impossible [Charvet] |
22846 | The universalism of utilitarianism implies a world state [Charvet] |
22835 | Liberals value freedom and equality, but the society itself must decide on its values [Charvet] |
22831 | Modern libertarian societies still provide education and some housing [Charvet] |
22839 | Liberalism needs people to either have equal autonomy, or everyone to have enough autonomy [Charvet] |
22847 | Kant places a higher value on the universal rational will than on the people asserting it [Charvet] |
22821 | Liberalism asserts maximum freedom, but that must be equal for all participants [Charvet] |
22834 | Egalitarian liberals prefer equality (either of input or outcome) to liberty [Charvet] |
22822 | Liberals promote community and well-being - because all good societies need them [Charvet] |
22841 | Identity multiculturalism emerges from communitarianism, preferring community to humanity [Charvet] |
22842 | For communitarians it seems that you must accept the culture you are born into [Charvet] |
22830 | Give by ability and receive by need, rather than a free labour market [Charvet] |
22829 | Allowing defamatory speech is against society's interests, by blurring which people are trustworthy [Charvet] |
22836 | 'Freedom from' is an empty idea, if the freedom is not from impediments to my desires [Charvet] |
22837 | Positive freedom can lead to coercion, if you are forced to do what you chose to do [Charvet] |
22844 | First level autonomy is application of personal values; second level is criticising them [Charvet] |
22840 | Mere equality, as in two trees being the same height, has no value at all [Charvet] |
22843 | Inequalities are worse if they seem to be your fault, rather than social facts [Charvet] |
22845 | Money allows unlimited inequalities, and we obviously all agree to money [Charvet] |
22823 | The rule of law is mainly to restrict governments [Charvet] |
22825 | The 1689 Bill of Rights denied the monarch new courts, or the right to sit as judge [Charvet] |
22826 | From 1701 only parliament could remove judges, whose decisions could not be discussed [Charvet] |
22827 | Justice superior to the rule of law is claimed on behalf of the workers, or the will of the nation [Charvet] |
22828 | The rule of law mainly benefits those with property and liberties [Charvet] |
22832 | Welfare is needed if citizens are to accept the obligations of a liberal state [Charvet] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
8432 | Analyse counterfactuals using causation, not the other way around [Horwich] |