31 ideas
7920 | Descriptive metaphysics aims at actual structure, revisionary metaphysics at a better structure [Strawson,P] |
7922 | Descriptive metaphysics concerns unchanging core concepts and categories [Strawson,P] |
7921 | Close examination of actual word usage is the only sure way in philosophy [Strawson,P] |
10842 | The fact which is stated by a true sentence is not something in the world [Strawson,P] |
10843 | Facts aren't exactly true statements, but they are what those statements say [Strawson,P] |
10844 | The statement that it is raining perfectly fits the fact that it is raining [Strawson,P] |
10841 | The word 'true' always refers to a possible statement [Strawson,P] |
10751 | Second-order logic needs the sets, and its consequence has epistemological problems [Rossberg] |
10757 | Henkin semantics has a second domain of predicates and relations (in upper case) [Rossberg] |
10759 | There are at least seven possible systems of semantics for second-order logic [Rossberg] |
10753 | Logical consequence is intuitively semantic, and captured by model theory [Rossberg] |
10752 | Γ |- S says S can be deduced from Γ; Γ |= S says a good model for Γ makes S true [Rossberg] |
8358 | There are no rules for the exact logic of ordinary language, because that doesn't exist [Strawson,P] |
10754 | In proof-theory, logical form is shown by the logical constants [Rossberg] |
6413 | 'The present King of France is bald' presupposes existence, rather than stating it [Strawson,P, by Grayling] |
8354 | Russell asks when 'The King of France is wise' would be a true assertion [Strawson,P] |
10756 | A model is a domain, and an interpretation assigning objects, predicates, relations etc. [Rossberg] |
10758 | If models of a mathematical theory are all isomorphic, it is 'categorical', with essentially one model [Rossberg] |
10761 | Completeness can always be achieved by cunning model-design [Rossberg] |
10755 | A deductive system is only incomplete with respect to a formal semantics [Rossberg] |
16980 | We need a logical use of 'object' as predicate-worthy, and an 'ontological' use [Strawson,P] |
16979 | It makes no sense to ask of some individual thing what it is that makes it that individual [Strawson,P] |
9282 | I can only apply consciousness predicates to myself if I can apply them to others [Strawson,P] |
9263 | A person is an entity to which we can ascribe predicates of consciousness and corporeality [Strawson,P] |
8356 | The meaning of an expression or sentence is general directions for its use, to refer or to assert [Strawson,P] |
10430 | Reference is mainly a social phenomenon [Strawson,P, by Sainsbury] |
10448 | If an expression can refer to anything, it may still instrinsically refer, but relative to a context [Bach on Strawson,P] |
8355 | Expressions don't refer; people use expressions to refer [Strawson,P] |
8357 | If an utterance fails to refer then it is a pseudo-use, though a speaker may think they assert something [Strawson,P] |
9281 | The idea of a predicate matches a range of things to which it can be applied [Strawson,P] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |