Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Peter Singer and Robert Audi

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44 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer]
In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer]
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]