52 ideas
| 23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
| 9065 | S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9064 | Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9044 | If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9048 | The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9055 | The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9049 | Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9056 | Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9058 | Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9059 | The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9060 | Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9050 | A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9061 | People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9062 | If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9063 | How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9045 | Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9047 | Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith] |
| 9053 | If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith] |
| 24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
| 24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
| 23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
| 23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
| 23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
| 23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
| 23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
| 23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
| 23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
| 23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
| 23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
| 23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
| 24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
| 23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
| 23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
| 23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
| 23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
| 23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
| 23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
| 23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
| 23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
| 23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
| 23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
| 23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
| 23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
| 23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
| 23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
| 23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
| 24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
| 24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
| 24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
| 24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| 23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |