68 ideas
9786 | Philosophers working like teams of scientists is absurd, yet isolation is hard [Cartwright,R] |
9784 | A false proposition isn't truer because it is part of a coherent system [Cartwright,R] |
13941 | Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R] |
13942 | Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R] |
15186 | In the tenseless view, all times are equally real, so statements of the future have truth-values [Le Poidevin] |
22919 | A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin] |
9783 | While no two classes coincide in membership, there are distinct but coextensive attributes [Cartwright,R] |
14961 | Clearly a pipe can survive being taken apart [Cartwright,R] |
14962 | Bodies don't becomes scattered by losing small or minor parts [Cartwright,R] |
13952 | Essentialism says some of a thing's properties are necessary, and could not be absent [Cartwright,R] |
13954 | The difficulty in essentialism is deciding the grounds for rating an attribute as essential [Cartwright,R] |
13955 | Essentialism is said to be unintelligible, because relative, if necessary truths are all analytic [Cartwright,R] |
13953 | An act of ostension doesn't seem to need a 'sort' of thing, even of a very broad kind [Cartwright,R] |
13945 | A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R] |
15207 | We want illuminating theories, rather than coherent theories [Le Poidevin] |
22926 | In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin] |
13950 | People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R] |
13948 | For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R] |
22932 | We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin] |
13944 | We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R] |
13947 | 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R] |
13943 | We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R] |
13946 | To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R] |
13951 | Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R] |
6866 | It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin] |
15190 | Evil can't be an illusion, because then the illusion that there is evil would be evil [Le Poidevin] |
6867 | Existentialism focuses on freedom and self-making, and insertion into the world [Le Poidevin] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
22927 | The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin] |
22922 | We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin] |
22924 | If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin] |
22923 | Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin] |
22928 | For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin] |
22931 | We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin] |
22917 | Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin] |
22921 | Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin] |
15195 | If the future is not real, we don't seem to have any obligation to future individuals [Le Poidevin] |
15188 | If things don't persist through time, then change makes no sense [Le Poidevin] |
22934 | Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin] |
15191 | At the very least, minds themselves seem to be tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15197 | Fiction seems to lack a tensed perspective, and offers an example of tenseless language [Le Poidevin] |
15206 | It is the view of the future that really decides between tensed and tenseless views of time [Le Poidevin] |
15198 | In the B-series, time-positions are unchanging; in the A-series they change (from future to present to past) [Le Poidevin] |
15189 | Things which have ceased change their A-series position; things that persist change their B-series position [Le Poidevin] |
6865 | A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin] |
15187 | It is claimed that the tense view entails the unreality of both future and past [Le Poidevin] |
15205 | Tensed theorists typically try to reduce the tenseless to the tensed [Le Poidevin] |
15192 | We share a common now, but not a common here [Le Poidevin] |
15193 | The new tenseless theory offers indexical truth-conditions, instead of a reductive analysis [Le Poidevin] |
22938 | To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin] |
22939 | The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin] |
22940 | If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin] |
22953 | Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin] |
22947 | An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin] |
22952 | If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin] |
22951 | If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin] |
22948 | There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin] |
22949 | Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin] |
22950 | If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin] |
22943 | Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin] |
22945 | The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin] |
22937 | If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin] |
22925 | The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin] |
22944 | The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin] |
22942 | If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin] |
22946 | The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin] |
15196 | God being inside or outside of time both raise a group of difficult problems [Le Poidevin] |
22941 | How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin] |