Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Roderick Chisholm and Lucretius

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88 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The concept of truth was originated by the senses [Lucretius]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm]
A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm]
I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Chisholm divides things into contingent and necessary, and then individuals, states and non-states [Chisholm, by Westerhoff]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If there are essential properties, how do you find out what they are? [Chisholm]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Could possible Adam gradually transform into Noah, and vice versa? [Chisholm]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 5. Aiming at Truth
We have a basic epistemic duty to believe truth and avoid error [Chisholm, by Kvanvig]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm]
If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm]
So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 4. Pro-Empiricism
If the senses are deceptive, reason, which rests on them, is even worse [Lucretius]
The senses are much the best way to distinguish true from false [Lucretius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
The 'doctrine of the given' is correct; some beliefs or statements are self-justifying [Chisholm]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / c. Empirical foundations
The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Most supposed delusions of the senses are really misinterpretations by the mind [Lucretius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Even simple facts are hard to believe at first hearing [Lucretius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / d. Location of mind
The mind is in the middle of the breast, because there we experience fear and joy [Lucretius]
The mind is a part of a man, just like a hand or an eye [Lucretius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
The separate elements and capacities of a mind cannot be distinguished [Lucretius]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
The actions of the mind are not determinate and passive, because atoms can swerve [Lucretius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm]
If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm]
Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Only bodies can touch one another [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
The earth is and always has been an insentient being [Lucretius]
Particles may have sensation, but eggs turning into chicks suggests otherwise [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The mind moves limbs, wakes the body up, changes facial expressions, which involve touch [Lucretius]
Lions, foxes and deer have distinct characters because their minds share in their bodies [Lucretius]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
You needn't be made of laughing particles to laugh, so why not sensation from senseless seeds? [Lucretius]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 1. Action Theory
If a desire leads to a satisfactory result by an odd route, the causal theory looks wrong [Chisholm]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
There has to be a brain event which is not caused by another event, but by the agent [Chisholm]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm]
Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
One man's meat is another man's poison [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Our bodies weren't created to be used; on the contrary, their creation makes a use possible [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
The dead are no different from those who were never born [Lucretius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
Nature only wants two things: freedom from pain, and pleasure [Lucretius]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Nature runs the universe by herself without the aid of gods [Lucretius]
The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There can be no centre in infinity [Lucretius]
The universe must be limitless, since there could be nothing outside to limit it [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Everything is created and fed by nature from atoms, and they return to atoms in death [Lucretius]
If an object is infinitely subdivisible, it will be the same as the whole universe [Lucretius]
In downward motion, atoms occasionally swerve slightly for no reason [Lucretius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
Nothing can break the binding laws of eternity [Lucretius]
A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If there were no space there could be no movement, or even creation [Lucretius]
Atoms move themselves [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
It is quicker to break things up than to assemble them [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
We can only sense time by means of movement, or its absence [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
This earth is very unlikely to be the only one created [Lucretius]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
Nothing can be created by divine power out of nothing [Lucretius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
If matter wasn't everlasting, everything would have disappeared by now [Lucretius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
The universe can't have been created by gods, because it is too imperfect [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 3. Deism
Gods are tranquil and aloof, and have no need of or interest in us [Lucretius]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Why does Jupiter never hurl lightning from a blue sky? [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
For a separated spirit to remain sentient it would need sense organs attached to it [Lucretius]
An immortal mind couldn't work harmoniously with a mortal body [Lucretius]
Spirit is mortal [Lucretius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The mind is very small smooth particles, which evaporate at death [Lucretius]
If spirit is immortal and enters us at birth, why don't we remember a previous existence? [Lucretius]