Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Rosalind Hursthouse and Robert C. Solomon

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58 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom needs both thought and passion, with each reflecting on the other [Solomon]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Philosophy is creating an intellectual conceptual structure for life [Solomon]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is actually passions, guided by perspicacious reflection [Solomon]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
We often trust our intuitions as rational, despite their lack of reflection [Solomon]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Distinguishing reason from passion is based on an archaic 'faculty' theory [Solomon]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
The word 'person' is useless in ethics, because what counts as a good or bad self-conscious being? [Hursthouse]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
I say bodily chemistry and its sensations have nothing to do with emotions [Solomon]
Emotions are judgements about ourselves, and our place in the world [Solomon]
Emotions are defined by their objects [Solomon]
The heart of an emotion is its judgement of values and morality [Solomon]
Emotions can be analysed under fifteen headings [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some emotions are externally directed, others internally [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
It is only our passions which give our lives meaning [Solomon]
Which emotions we feel depends on our sense of our own powers [Solomon]
The passions are subjective, concerning what is important to me, rather than facts [Solomon]
Emotions are strategies for maximising our sense of dignity and self-esteem [Solomon]
Passions exist as emotions, moods and desires, which all generate meaning [Solomon]
The Myth of the Passions says they are irrational, uncontrolled and damaging [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Feeling is a superficial aspect of emotion, and may be indeterminate, or even absent [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
There are no 'basic' emotions, only socially prevalent ones [Solomon]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
It is reason which needs the anchorage of passions, rather than vice versa [Solomon]
Dividing ourselves into confrontational reason and passion destroys our harmonious whole [Solomon]
The supposed irrationality of our emotions is often tactless or faulty expression of them [Solomon]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
There may be inverse akrasia, where the agent's action is better than their judgement recommends [Hursthouse]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Must all actions be caused in part by a desire, or can a belief on its own be sufficient? [Hursthouse]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
It is a fantasy that only through the study of philosophy can one become virtuous [Hursthouse]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
You are not a dishonest person if a tragic dilemma forces you to do something dishonest [Hursthouse]
After a moral dilemma is resolved there is still a 'remainder', requiring (say) regret [Hursthouse]
Deontologists resolve moral dilemmas by saying the rule conflict is merely apparent [Hursthouse]
Involuntary actions performed in tragic dilemmas are bad because they mar a good life [Hursthouse]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Emotions are our life force, and the source of most of our values [Solomon]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Lovers adopt the interests of their beloved, rather than just valuing them [Solomon]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / d. Good as virtue
Virtue may be neither sufficient nor necessary for eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Teenagers are often quite wise about ideals, but rather stupid about consequences [Hursthouse]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Animals and plants can 'flourish', but only rational beings can have eudaimonia [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
When it comes to bringing up children, most of us think that the virtues are the best bet [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Eudaimonia first; virtue is a trait which promotes it; right acts are what virtues produce [Hursthouse, by Zagzebski]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
Any strict ranking of virtues or rules gets abandoned when faced with particular cases [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtue ethics is open to the objection that it fails to show priority among the virtues [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / a. Natural virtue
Good animals can survive, breed, feel characteristic pleasure and pain, and contribute to the group [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtuous people may not be fully clear about their reasons for action [Hursthouse]
Performing an act simply because it is virtuous is sufficient to be 'morally motivated' or 'dutiful' [Hursthouse]
If moral motivation is an all-or-nothing sense of duty, how can children act morally? [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
The emotions of sympathy, compassion and love are no guarantee of right action or acting well [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / i. Absolute virtues
According to virtue ethics, two agents may respond differently, and yet both be right [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Maybe in a deeply poisoned character none of their milder character traits could ever be a virtue [Hursthouse]
Being unusually virtuous in some areas may entail being less virtuous in others [Hursthouse]
We are puzzled by a person who can show an exceptional virtue and also behave very badly [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Deontologists do consider consequences, because they reveal when a rule might apply [Hursthouse]
'Codifiable' morality give rules for decisions which don't require wisdom [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Preference utilitarianism aims to be completely value-free, or empirical [Hursthouse]
We are torn between utilitarian and deontological views of lying, depending on the examples [Hursthouse]
Deontologists usually accuse utilitarians of oversimplifying hard cases [Hursthouse]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
'Absurdity' is just the result of our wrong choices in life [Solomon]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
We are distinct from other animals in behaving rationally - pursuing something as good, for reasons [Hursthouse]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Ideologies are mythologies which guide our actions [Solomon]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
If people are virtuous in obedience to God, would they become wicked if they lost their faith? [Hursthouse]