Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Ross P. Cameron and Laozi (Lao Tzu)

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people choose inaction and silence [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
One who knows does not speak; one who speaks does not know [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Vulgar people are alert; I alone am muddled [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron]
If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron]
God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron]
Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron]
Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron]
Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron]
The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 9. Making Past Truths
The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron]
One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron]
We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron]
Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron]
Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron]
Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron]
An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
To know yet to think that one does not know is best [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
Pursuit of learning increases activity; the Way decreases it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Truth is not beautiful; beautiful speech is not truthful [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
One with no use for life is wiser than one who values it [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Do good to him who has done you an injury [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The highest virtue is achieved without effort [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
To gain in goodness, treat as good those who are good, and those who are not [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / g. Desires
There is no crime greater than having too many desires [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / a. Autocracy
The best rulers are invisible, the next admired, the next feared, and the worst are exploited [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People are hard to govern because authorities love to do things [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The better known the law, the more criminals there are [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / e. Peace
A military victory is not a thing of beauty [Laozi (Lao Tzu)]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron]