17 ideas
| 22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
| 7760 | Russell only uses descriptions attributively, and Strawson only referentially [Donnellan, by Lycan] |
| 5811 | A definite description can have a non-referential use [Donnellan] |
| 5812 | Definite descriptions are 'attributive' if they say something about x, and 'referential' if they pick x out [Donnellan] |
| 5814 | 'The x is F' only presumes that x exists; it does not actually entail the existence [Donnellan] |
| 22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
| 22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
| 22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
| 22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
| 22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
| 10435 | A definite description 'the F' is referential if the speaker could thereby be referring to something not-F [Donnellan, by Sainsbury] |
| 10451 | Donnellan is unclear whether the referential-attributive distinction is semantic or pragmatic [Bach on Donnellan] |
| 5813 | A description can successfully refer, even if its application to the subject is not believed [Donnellan] |
| 5815 | Whether a definite description is referential or attributive depends on the speaker's intention [Donnellan] |
| 22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
| 22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |