13 ideas
| 16065 | Constitution is identity (being in the same place), or it isn't (having different possibilities) [Wasserman] |
| 16067 | Constitution is not identity, because it is an asymmetric dependence relation [Wasserman] |
| 16069 | There are three main objections to seeing constitution as different from identity [Wasserman] |
| 16068 | The weight of a wall is not the weight of its parts, since that would involve double-counting [Wasserman] |
| 16074 | Relative identity may reject transitivity, but that suggests that it isn't about 'identity' [Wasserman] |
| 17488 | Empiricist theories are sets of laws, which give explanations and reductions [Glennan] |
| 17493 | Modern mechanism need parts with spatial, temporal and function facts, and diagrams [Glennan] |
| 17487 | Mechanistic philosophy of science is an alternative to the empiricist law-based tradition [Glennan] |
| 17489 | Mechanisms are either systems of parts or sequences of activities [Glennan] |
| 17490 | 17th century mechanists explained everything by the kinetic physical fundamentals [Glennan] |
| 17491 | Unlike the lawlike approach, mechanistic explanation can allow for exceptions [Glennan] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| 17494 | Since causal events are related by mechanisms, causation can be analysed in that way [Glennan] |