455 ideas
9593 | Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson] |
13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9184 | We can't presume that all interesting concepts can be analysed [Williamson] |
8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
22270 | Frege changed philosophy by extending logic's ability to check the grounds of thinking [Potter on Frege] |
15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
6859 | Analytic philosophy has much higher standards of thinking than continental philosophy [Williamson] |
10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
7740 | There exists a realm, beyond objects and ideas, of non-spatio-temporal thoughts [Frege, by Weiner] |
8939 | We should not describe human laws of thought, but how to correctly track truth [Frege, by Fisher] |
9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
16877 | A 'constructive' (as opposed to 'analytic') definition creates a new sign [Frege] |
9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
11219 | Frege suggested that mathematics should only accept stipulative definitions [Frege, by Gupta] |
10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
16878 | We must be clear about every premise and every law used in a proof [Frege] |
8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
19466 | The word 'true' seems to be unique and indefinable [Frege] |
8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
21616 | Truth and falsity apply to suppositions as well as to assertions [Williamson] |
22317 | Truth does not admit of more and less [Frege] |
21623 | True and false are not symmetrical; false is more complex, involving negation [Williamson] |
15134 | The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson] |
13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
15141 | Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson] |
15140 | The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson] |
19465 | There cannot be complete correspondence, because ideas and reality are quite different [Frege] |
9594 | Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson] |
19468 | The property of truth in 'It is true that I smell violets' adds nothing to 'I smell violets' [Frege] |
18806 | Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt] |
9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
4971 | I don't use 'subject' and 'predicate' in my way of representing a judgement [Frege] |
17745 | For Frege, 'All A's are B's' means that the concept A implies the concept B [Frege, by Walicki] |
15131 | If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson] |
14626 | In S5 matters of possibility and necessity are non-contingent [Williamson] |
15135 | If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson] |
15130 | If a property is possible, there is something which can have it [Williamson] |
15139 | Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson] |
21602 | Many-valued logics don't solve vagueness; its presence at the meta-level is ignored [Williamson] |
6862 | Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of truth, but it implies contradictions [Williamson] |
13455 | Frege did not think of himself as working with sets [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
16895 | The null set is indefensible, because it collects nothing [Frege, by Burge] |
14238 | A class is an aggregate of objects; if you destroy them, you destroy the class; there is no empty class [Frege] |
9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
3328 | Frege proposed a realist concept of a set, as the extension of a predicate or concept or function [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
7728 | Frege has a judgement stroke (vertical, asserting or judging) and a content stroke (horizontal, expressing) [Frege, by Weiner] |
16881 | The laws of logic are boundless, so we want the few whose power contains the others [Frege] |
7622 | In 1879 Frege developed second order logic [Frege, by Putnam] |
9179 | Frege frequently expressed a contempt for language [Frege, by Dummett] |
16867 | Logic not only proves things, but also reveals logical relations between them [Frege] |
6858 | Formal logic struck me as exactly the language I wanted to think in [Williamson] |
16863 | Does some mathematical reasoning (such as mathematical induction) not belong to logic? [Frege] |
16862 | The closest subject to logic is mathematics, which does little apart from drawing inferences [Frege] |
21611 | Formal semantics defines validity as truth preserved in every model [Williamson] |
13473 | Frege thinks there is an independent logical order of the truths, which we must try to discover [Frege, by Hart,WD] |
21606 | 'Bivalence' is the meta-linguistic principle that 'A' in the object language is true or false [Williamson] |
21605 | Excluded Middle is 'A or not A' in the object language [Williamson] |
7729 | Frege replaced Aristotle's subject/predicate form with function/argument form [Frege, by Weiner] |
8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
8490 | First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege] |
8492 | Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege] |
3319 | Frege gives a functional account of predication so that we can dispense with predicates [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
6076 | For Frege, predicates are names of functions that map objects onto the True and False [Frege, by McGinn] |
16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
16865 | 'Theorems' are both proved, and used in proofs [Frege] |
18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
8447 | In 'Etna is higher than Vesuvius' the whole of Etna, including all the lava, can't be the reference [Frege] |
10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
8448 | Any object can have many different names, each with a distinct sense [Frege] |
14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
13733 | Frege considered definite descriptions to be genuine singular terms [Frege, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
9950 | A quantifier is a second-level predicate (which explains how it contributes to truth-conditions) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
18492 | Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
9991 | For Frege the variable ranges over all objects [Frege, by Tait] |
10536 | Frege's domain for variables is all objects, but modern interpretations first fix the domain [Dummett on Frege] |
9871 | Frege always, and fatally, neglected the domain of quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
7730 | Frege introduced quantifiers for generality [Frege, by Weiner] |
7742 | Frege reduced most quantifiers to 'everything' combined with 'not' [Frege, by McCullogh] |
9874 | Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege] |
15136 | Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson] |
14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
15138 | Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson] |
13824 | Proof theory began with Frege's definition of derivability [Frege, by Prawitz] |
13609 | Frege produced axioms for logic, though that does not now seem the natural basis for logic [Frege, by Kaplan] |
21612 | Or-elimination is 'Argument by Cases'; it shows how to derive C from 'A or B' [Williamson] |
16884 | Basic truths of logic are not proved, but seen as true when they are understood [Frege, by Burge] |
9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
16886 | The truth of an axiom must be independently recognisable [Frege] |
17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
16866 | Tracing inference backwards closes in on a small set of axioms and postulates [Frege] |
16868 | The essence of mathematics is the kernel of primitive truths on which it rests [Frege] |
16871 | A truth can be an axiom in one system and not in another [Frege] |
16870 | Axioms are truths which cannot be doubted, and for which no proof is needed [Frege] |
21599 | A sorites stops when it collides with an opposite sorites [Williamson] |
16869 | To create order in mathematics we need a full system, guided by patterns of inference [Frege] |
9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
18256 | Quantity is inconceivable without the idea of addition [Frege] |
8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
18252 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities, such as lengths or masses [Frege] |
18253 | I wish to go straight from cardinals to reals (as ratios), leaving out the rationals [Frege] |
9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
18271 | We can't prove everything, but we can spell out the unproved, so that foundations are clear [Frege] |
16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
16864 | If principles are provable, they are theorems; if not, they are axioms [Frege] |
17855 | It may be possible to define induction in terms of the ancestral relation [Frege, by Wright,C] |
10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
3331 | If '5' is the set of all sets with five members, that may be circular, and you can know a priori if the set has content [Benardete,JA on Frege] |
9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10623 | Frege defined number in terms of extensions of concepts, but needed Basic Law V to explain extensions [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
9975 | Frege ignored Cantor's warning that a cardinal set is not just a concept-extension [Tait on Frege] |
10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
9183 | Platonism claims that some true assertions have singular terms denoting abstractions, so abstractions exist [Williamson] |
17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
9831 | Geometry appeals to intuition as the source of its axioms [Frege] |
8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
9577 | The naďve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
16880 | Frege aimed to discover the logical foundations which justify arithmetical judgements [Frege, by Burge] |
8689 | Eventually Frege tried to found arithmetic in geometry instead of in logic [Frege, by Friend] |
8487 | Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege] |
18165 | My Basic Law V is a law of pure logic [Frege] |
18166 | The loss of my Rule V seems to make foundations for arithmetic impossible [Frege] |
10607 | Frege's logic has a hierarchy of object, property, property-of-property etc. [Frege, by Smith,P] |
10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
9545 | Late in life Frege abandoned logicism, and saw the source of arithmetic as geometrical [Frege, by Chihara] |
9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
11008 | Existence is not a first-order property, but the instantiation of a property [Frege, by Read] |
8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
19470 | Thoughts in the 'third realm' cannot be sensed, and do not need an owner to exist [Frege] |
5657 | Frege's logic showed that there is no concept of being [Frege, by Scruton] |
8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
18899 | Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers] |
18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
9601 | The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson] |
15137 | If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson] |
19471 | A fact is a thought that is true [Frege] |
21589 | When bivalence is rejected because of vagueness, we lose classical logic [Williamson] |
21596 | Vagueness undermines the stable references needed by logic [Williamson] |
21601 | A vague term can refer to very precise elements [Williamson] |
21629 | Equally fuzzy objects can be identical, so fuzziness doesn't entail vagueness [Williamson] |
9599 | There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson] |
21591 | Vagueness is epistemic. Statements are true or false, but we often don't know which [Williamson] |
21619 | If a heap has a real boundary, omniscient speakers would agree where it is [Williamson] |
21620 | The epistemic view says that the essence of vagueness is ignorance [Williamson] |
21622 | If there is a true borderline of which we are ignorant, this drives a wedge between meaning and use [Williamson] |
9120 | Vagueness in a concept is its indiscriminability from other possible concepts [Williamson] |
6863 | Close to conceptual boundaries judgement is too unreliable to give knowledge [Williamson] |
21625 | The vagueness of 'heap' can remain even when the context is fixed [Williamson] |
21614 | The 'nihilist' view of vagueness says that 'heap' is not a legitimate concept [Williamson] |
21617 | We can say propositions are bivalent, but vague utterances don't express a proposition [Williamson] |
21618 | If the vague 'TW is thin' says nothing, what does 'TW is thin if his perfect twin is thin' say? [Williamson] |
17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
21590 | Asking when someone is 'clearly' old is higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
21592 | Supervaluation keeps classical logic, but changes the truth in classical semantics [Williamson] |
21603 | You can't give a precise description of a language which is intrinsically vague [Williamson] |
21604 | Supervaluation assigns truth when all the facts are respected [Williamson] |
21607 | Supervaluation has excluded middle but not bivalence; 'A or not-A' is true, even when A is undecided [Williamson] |
21608 | Truth-functionality for compound statements fails in supervaluation [Williamson] |
21609 | Supervaluationism defines 'supertruth', but neglects it when defining 'valid' [Williamson] |
21610 | Supervaluation adds a 'definitely' operator to classical logic [Williamson] |
21613 | Supervaluationism cannot eliminate higher-order vagueness [Williamson] |
13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
4028 | Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege] |
10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
21633 | Nominalists suspect that properties etc are our projections, and could have been different [Williamson] |
8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
18269 | Logical objects are extensions of concepts, or ranges of values of functions [Frege] |
8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
8489 | The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege] |
10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
9877 | Late Frege saw his non-actual objective objects as exclusively thoughts and senses [Frege, by Dummett] |
17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
9388 | Every concept must have a sharp boundary; we cannot allow an indeterminate third case [Frege] |
6861 | What sort of logic is needed for vague concepts, and what sort of concept of truth? [Williamson] |
9602 | Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson] |
21630 | If fuzzy edges are fine, then why not fuzzy temporal, modal or mereological boundaries? [Williamson] |
21632 | A river is not just event; it needs actual and counterfactual boundaries [Williamson] |
16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
3318 | Frege made identity a logical notion, enshrined above all in the formula 'for all x, x=x' [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
14625 | Necessity is counterfactually implied by its negation; possibility does not counterfactually imply its negation [Williamson] |
14623 | Strict conditionals imply counterfactual conditionals: □(A⊃B)⊃(A□→B) [Williamson] |
14624 | Counterfactual conditionals transmit possibility: (A□→B)⊃(◊A⊃◊B) [Williamson] |
14531 | Rather than define counterfactuals using necessity, maybe necessity is a special case of counterfactuals [Williamson, by Hale/Hoffmann,A] |
21621 | We can't infer metaphysical necessities to be a priori knowable - or indeed knowable in any way [Williamson] |
9598 | Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson] |
16536 | Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson] |
9596 | We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson] |
15142 | Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson] |
18925 | If talking donkeys are possible, something exists which could be a talking donkey [Williamson, by Cameron] |
21627 | We have inexact knowledge when we include margins of error [Williamson] |
17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
16885 | To understand a thought, understand its inferential connections to other thoughts [Frege, by Burge] |
4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
16887 | Frege's concept of 'self-evident' makes no reference to minds [Frege, by Burge] |
8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
9597 | There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson] |
16894 | An apriori truth is grounded in generality, which is universal quantification [Frege, by Burge] |
9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
6860 | How can one discriminate yellow from red, but not the colours in between? [Williamson] |
16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
9592 | Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson] |
20181 | When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson] |
21626 | Knowing you know (KK) is usually denied if the knowledge concept is missing, or not considered [Williamson] |
16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
11052 | Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege] |
16882 | The building blocks contain the whole contents of a discipline [Frege] |
8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
14628 | Imagination is important, in evaluating possibility and necessity, via counterfactuals [Williamson] |
19469 | We grasp thoughts (thinking), decide they are true (judgement), and manifest the judgement (assertion) [Frege] |
8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
8162 | Thoughts have their own realm of reality - 'sense' (as opposed to the realm of 'reference') [Frege, by Dummett] |
9818 | A thought is distinguished from other things by a capacity to be true or false [Frege, by Dummett] |
21631 | To know, believe, hope or fear, one must grasp the thought, but not when you fail to do them [Williamson] |
18265 | We don't judge by combining subject and concept; we get a concept by splitting up a judgement [Frege] |
16379 | Thoughts about myself are understood one way to me, and another when communicated [Frege] |
16876 | We need definitions to cram retrievable sense into a signed receptacle [Frege] |
16875 | We use signs to mark receptacles for complex senses [Frege] |
9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
9947 | Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
10319 | An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale] |
8488 | A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege] |
18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
9190 | A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
13665 | Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic [Frege, by Shapiro] |
9948 | Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
21600 | 'Blue' is not a family resemblance, because all the blues resemble in some respect [Williamson] |
8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
5816 | Frege said concepts were abstract entities, not mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |
9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
7307 | A thought is not psychological, but a condition of the world that makes a sentence true [Frege, by Miller,A] |
4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
9595 | You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson] |
16879 | A sign won't gain sense just from being used in sentences with familiar components [Frege] |
8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
8446 | We understand new propositions by constructing their sense from the words [Frege] |
9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
21615 | References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson] |
15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
8449 | Senses can't be subjective, because propositions would be private, and disagreement impossible [Frege] |
15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
4972 | I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege] |
18038 | The 't' and 'f' of formal semantics has no philosophical interest, and may not refer to true and false [Williamson] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
22280 | Frege's account was top-down and decompositional, not bottom-up and compositional [Frege, by Potter] |
7309 | Frege's 'sense' is the strict and literal meaning, stripped of tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
7312 | 'Sense' solves the problems of bearerless names, substitution in beliefs, and informativeness [Frege, by Miller,A] |
11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
16873 | Thoughts are not subjective or psychological, because some thoughts are the same for us all [Frege] |
16872 | A thought is the sense expressed by a sentence, and is what we prove [Frege] |
19467 | A 'thought' is something for which the question of truth can arise; thoughts are senses of sentences [Frege] |
21624 | It is known that there is a cognitive loss in identifying propositions with possible worlds [Williamson] |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
16874 | The parts of a thought map onto the parts of a sentence [Frege] |
19472 | A sentence is only a thought if it is complete, and has a time-specification [Frege] |
9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
7725 | 'P or not-p' seems to be analytic, but does not fit Kant's account, lacking clear subject or predicate [Frege, by Weiner] |
20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
7316 | Analytic truths are those that can be demonstrated using only logic and definitions [Frege, by Miller,A] |
2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
9600 | If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson] |
8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
3307 | Frege put forward an ontological argument for the existence of numbers [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
15133 | A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson] |
7741 | The predicate 'exists' is actually a natural language expression for a quantifier [Frege, by Weiner] |
22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
8491 | The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege] |