Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Hermarchus, Tyler Burge and Brian Clegg

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35 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg]
Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge]
You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg]
Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / k. Imaginary numbers
By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg]
The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge]
Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry]