11 ideas
| 21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |
| 6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
| 18430 | We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards] |
| 18432 | Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards] |
| 18437 | Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards] |
| 18434 | That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| 6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |