776 ideas
| 5540 | Cleverness is shown in knowing what can reasonably be asked [Kant] |
| 6200 | Wisdom is knowing the highest good, and conforming the will to it [Kant] |
| 21422 | Moral self-knowledge is the beginning of all human wisdom [Kant] |
| 9764 | Inspiration and social improvement need wisdom, but not professional philosophy [Quine] |
| 21955 | My dogmatic slumber was first interrupted by David Hume [Kant] |
| 6207 | What fills me with awe are the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me [Kant] |
| 5631 | Reason is only interested in knowledge, actions and hopes [Kant] |
| 6184 | Consistency is the highest obligation of a philosopher [Kant] |
| 21406 | Because there is only one human reason, there can only be one true philosophy from principles [Kant] |
| 9763 | For a good theory of the world, we must focus on our flabby foundational vocabulary [Quine] |
| 5635 | In ordinary life the highest philosophy is no better than common understanding [Kant] |
| 16931 | Metaphysics is generating a priori knowledge by intuition and concepts, leading to the synthetic [Kant] |
| 21954 | Metaphysics is a systematic account of everything that can be known a priori [Kant] |
| 13736 | Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine] |
| 7918 | Kant turned metaphysics into epistemology, ignoring Aristotle's 'being qua being' [Kant, by Macdonald,C] |
| 21438 | Metaphysics might do better to match objects to our cognition (and not start with the objects) [Kant] |
| 16611 | You just can't stop metaphysical speculation, in any mature mind [Kant] |
| 5586 | The voyage of reason may go only as far as the coastline of experience reaches [Kant] |
| 21462 | It is still possible to largely accept Kant as a whole (where others must be dismantled) [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 5600 | Human reason considers all knowledge as belonging to a possible system [Kant] |
| 21457 | Reason has two separate objects, morality and freedom, and nature, which ultimately unite [Kant] |
| 1627 | Any statement can be held true if we make enough adjustment to the rest of the system [Quine] |
| 22153 | Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter] |
| 22438 | Philosophy is largely concerned with finding the minimum that science could get by with [Quine] |
| 6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner] |
| 9752 | Kant showed that theoretical reason cannot give answers to speculative metaphysics [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6584 | A priori metaphysics is fond of basic unchanging entities like God, the soul, Forms, atoms… [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 3722 | Metaphysics goes beyond the empirical, so doesn't need examples [Kant] |
| 9349 | A dove cutting through the air, might think it could fly better in airless space (which Plato attempted) [Kant] |
| 6203 | Metaphysics is just a priori universal principles of physics [Kant] |
| 6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine] |
| 11103 | We aren't stuck with our native conceptual scheme; we can gradually change it [Quine] |
| 21408 | For any subject, its system of non-experiential concepts needs a metaphysics [Kant] |
| 12767 | Kant exposed the illusions of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic [Kant, by Fraassen] |
| 18259 | Analysis is becoming self-conscious about our concepts [Kant] |
| 9350 | Our reason mostly analyses concepts we already have of objects [Kant] |
| 5530 | Analysis of our concepts is merely a preparation for proper a priori metaphysics [Kant] |
| 8996 | If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine] |
| 22436 | Logicians don't paraphrase logic into language, because they think in the symbolic language [Quine] |
| 16943 | Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point [Quine] |
| 5622 | The boundaries of reason can only be determined a priori [Kant] |
| 5604 | In reason things can only begin if they are voluntary [Kant] |
| 5623 | If I know the earth is a sphere, and I am on it, I can work out its area from a small part [Kant] |
| 21416 | Philosophers should not offer multiple proofs - suggesting the weakness of each of them [Kant] |
| 5578 | Pure reason deals with concepts in the understanding, not with objects [Kant] |
| 5628 | Reason hates to be limited in its speculations [Kant] |
| 5603 | Pure reason exists outside of time [Kant] |
| 5616 | Pure reason is only concerned with itself because it deals with understandings, not objects [Kant] |
| 21054 | Reason enables the unbounded extension of our rules and intentions [Kant] |
| 3738 | The hallmark of rationality is setting itself an end [Kant] |
| 21439 | Religion and legislation can only be respected if they accept free and public examination [Kant] |
| 5584 | All objections are dogmatic (against propositions), or critical (against proofs), or sceptical [Kant] |
| 18236 | Reason keeps asking why until explanation is complete [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 5563 | The principle of sufficient reason is the ground of possible experience in time [Kant] |
| 5565 | Proof of the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found [Kant] |
| 9023 | If you say that a contradiction is true, you change the meaning of 'not', and so change the subject [Quine] |
| 6564 | To affirm 'p and not-p' is to have mislearned 'and' or 'not' [Quine] |
| 22431 | Good algorithms and theories need many occurrences of just a few elements [Quine] |
| 8207 | The quest for simplicity drove scientists to posit new entities, such as molecules in gases [Quine] |
| 8208 | In arithmetic, ratios, negatives, irrationals and imaginaries were created in order to generalise [Quine] |
| 5602 | The free dialectic opposition of arguments is an invaluable part of the sceptical method [Kant] |
| 1623 | Definition rests on synonymy, rather than explaining it [Quine] |
| 5618 | Definitions exhibit the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries [Kant] |
| 18261 | A simplification which is complete constitutes a definition [Kant] |
| 19048 | Contextual definition shifted the emphasis from words to whole sentences [Quine] |
| 8995 | Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine] |
| 19047 | Bentham's contextual definitions preserved terms after their denotation became doubtful [Quine] |
| 21699 | Russell offered a paraphrase of definite description, to avoid the commitment to objects [Quine] |
| 5619 | No a priori concept can be defined [Kant] |
| 22274 | 'Transcendent' is beyond experience, and 'transcendental' is concealed within experience [Kant, by Potter] |
| 5577 | Transcendental ideas require unity of the subject, conditions of appearance, and objects of thought [Kant] |
| 23696 | Transcendental cognition is that a priori thought which shows how the a priori is applicable or possible [Kant] |
| 5555 | Philosophical examples rarely fit rules properly, and lead to inflexibility [Kant] |
| 21697 | The Struthionic Fallacy is that of burying one's head in the sand [Quine] |
| 5539 | We must presuppose that truth is agreement of cognition with its objects [Kant] |
| 21750 | Science is sympathetic to truth as correspondence, since it depends on observation [Quine] |
| 9012 | Talk of 'truth' when sentences are mentioned; it reminds us that reality is the point of sentences [Quine] |
| 9011 | Truth is redundant for single sentences; we do better to simply speak the sentence [Quine] |
| 22435 | The logician's '→' does not mean the English if-then [Quine] |
| 5620 | Philosophy has no axioms, as it is just rational cognition of concepts [Kant] |
| 9013 | We can eliminate 'or' from our basic theory, by paraphrasing 'p or q' as 'not(not-p and not-q)' [Quine] |
| 10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
| 5745 | Quine says quantified modal logic creates nonsense, bad ontology, and false essentialism [Melia on Quine] |
| 13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
| 22433 | It is important that the quantification over temporal entities is timeless [Quine] |
| 3302 | Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 9879 | NF has no models, but just blocks the comprehension axiom, to avoid contradictions [Quine, by Dummett] |
| 10211 | Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 21717 | Reducibility undermines type ramification, and is committed to the existence of functions [Quine, by Linsky,B] |
| 18170 | The Axiom of Reducibility is self-effacing: if true, it isn't needed [Quine] |
| 21695 | The set scheme discredited by paradoxes is actually the most natural one [Quine] |
| 21693 | Russell's antinomy challenged the idea that any condition can produce a set [Quine] |
| 3336 | Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 18794 | Logic has precise boundaries, and is the formal rules for all thinking [Kant] |
| 9020 | My logical grammar has sentences by predication, then negation, conjunction, and existential quantification [Quine] |
| 13010 | In order to select the logic justified by experience, we would need to use a lot of logic [Boghossian on Quine] |
| 22275 | Logic gives us the necessary rules which show us how we ought to think [Kant] |
| 9028 | Maybe logical truth reflects reality, but in different ways in different languages [Quine] |
| 9002 | Elementary logic requires truth-functions, quantifiers (and variables), identity, and also sets of variables [Quine] |
| 13639 | Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 8789 | Various strategies try to deal with the ontological commitments of second-order logic [Hale/Wright on Quine] |
| 10014 | Quine rejects second-order logic, saying that predicates refer to multiple objects [Quine, by Hodes] |
| 10828 | Quantifying over predicates is treating them as names of entities [Quine] |
| 13681 | Logical consequence is marked by being preserved under all nonlogical substitutions [Quine, by Sider] |
| 12219 | Whether a modal claim is true depends on how the object is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 22437 | Logical languages are rooted in ordinary language, and that connection must be kept [Quine] |
| 10064 | Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave] |
| 20296 | Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey] |
| 8998 | Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine] |
| 8999 | Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine] |
| 9000 | If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine] |
| 19043 | Bivalence applies not just to sentences, but that general terms are true or false of each object [Quine] |
| 9024 | Excluded middle has three different definitions [Quine] |
| 10012 | Quantification theory can still be proved complete if we add identity [Quine] |
| 22434 | Reduction to logical forms first simplifies idioms and grammar, then finds a single reading of it [Quine] |
| 13829 | If logical truths essentially depend on logical constants, we had better define the latter [Hacking on Quine] |
| 1618 | We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine] |
| 12221 | 'Corner quotes' (quasi-quotation) designate 'whatever these terms designate' [Quine] |
| 21698 | All relations, apart from ancestrals, can be reduced to simpler logic [Quine] |
| 8453 | If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine] |
| 10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
| 19321 | We might do without names, by converting them into predicates [Quine, by Kirkham] |
| 8455 | Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8456 | Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 9204 | Quine's arguments fail because he naively conflates names with descriptions [Fine,K on Quine] |
| 9016 | Names are not essential, because naming can be turned into predication [Quine] |
| 1611 | Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine] |
| 10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
| 10922 | Objects are the values of variables, so a referentially opaque context cannot be quantified into [Quine] |
| 10311 | No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale] |
| 10538 | Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett] |
| 9015 | Universal quantification is widespread, but it is definable in terms of existential quantification [Quine] |
| 10793 | Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10801 | Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine] |
| 21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
| 9025 | You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine] |
| 9026 | Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine] |
| 10705 | Putting a predicate letter in a quantifier is to make it the name of an entity [Quine] |
| 12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
| 5542 | There must be a general content-free account of truth in the rules of logic [Kant] |
| 9027 | A sentence is logically true if all sentences with that grammatical structure are true [Quine] |
| 21454 | The battle of the antinomies is usually won by the attacker, and lost by any defender [Kant] |
| 21691 | Antinomies contradict accepted ways of reasoning, and demand revisions [Quine] |
| 21690 | Whenever the pursuer reaches the spot where the pursuer has been, the pursued has moved on [Quine] |
| 9003 | Set theory was struggling with higher infinities, when new paradoxes made it baffling [Quine] |
| 21689 | A barber shaves only those who do not shave themselves. So does he shave himself? [Quine] |
| 21694 | Membership conditions which involve membership and non-membership are paradoxical [Quine] |
| 21692 | If we write it as '"this sentence is false" is false', there is no paradox [Quine] |
| 16918 | Mathematics cannot proceed just by the analysis of concepts [Kant] |
| 16949 | Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations [Quine] |
| 8994 | If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine] |
| 16919 | Geometry rests on our intuition of space [Kant] |
| 8740 | Geometry would just be an idle game without its connection to our intuition [Kant] |
| 16899 | Geometrical truth comes from a general schema abstracted from a particular object [Kant, by Burge] |
| 16930 | Geometry is not analytic, because a line's being 'straight' is a quality [Kant] |
| 8739 | Geometry studies the Euclidean space that dictates how we perceive things [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 16920 | Numbers are formed by addition of units in time [Kant] |
| 17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine] |
| 16929 | 7+5 = 12 is not analytic, because no analysis of 7+5 will reveal the concept of 12 [Kant] |
| 9632 | Kant only accepts potential infinity, not actual infinity [Kant, by Brown,JR] |
| 3343 | Euclid's could be the only viable geometry, if rejection of the parallel line postulate doesn't lead to a contradiction [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 8997 | There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine] |
| 8737 | Kant suggested that arithmetic has no axioms [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 5557 | Axioms ought to be synthetic a priori propositions [Kant] |
| 8463 | Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine] |
| 8203 | All the arithmetical entities can be reduced to classes of integers, and hence to sets [Quine] |
| 10242 | I apply structuralism to concrete and abstract objects indiscriminately [Quine] |
| 12421 | Kant's intuitions struggle to judge relevance, impossibility and exactness [Kitcher on Kant] |
| 16910 | Mathematics can only start from an a priori intuition which is not empirical but pure [Kant] |
| 16917 | All necessary mathematical judgements are based on intuitions of space and time [Kant] |
| 21696 | Nominalism rejects both attributes and classes (where extensionalism accepts the classes) [Quine] |
| 17617 | Maths is a priori, but without its relation to empirical objects it is meaningless [Kant] |
| 17738 | Quine blurs the difference between knowledge of arithmetic and of physics [Jenkins on Quine] |
| 9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine] |
| 18198 | Mathematics is part of science; transfinite mathematics I take as mostly uninterpreted [Quine] |
| 16928 | Mathematics cannot be empirical because it is necessary, and that has to be a priori [Kant] |
| 8993 | If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine] |
| 21557 | Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey] |
| 12458 | Kant taught that mathematics is independent of logic, and cannot be grounded in it [Kant, by Hilbert] |
| 2795 | If 7+5=12 is analytic, then an infinity of other ways to reach 12 have to be analytic [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 1613 | Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine] |
| 9004 | If set theory is not actually a branch of logic, then Frege's derivation of arithmetic would not be from logic [Quine] |
| 1635 | Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine] |
| 1616 | Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine] |
| 1615 | Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine] |
| 8466 | For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8467 | Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 1614 | Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine] |
| 4475 | Saying a thing 'is' adds nothing to it - otherwise if my concept exists, it isn't the same as my concept [Kant] |
| 10241 | For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 16966 | Philosophers tend to distinguish broad 'being' from narrower 'existence' - but I reject that [Quine] |
| 4064 | The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane] |
| 1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
| 19277 | Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale] |
| 16965 | All we have of general existence is what existential quantifiers express [Quine] |
| 11092 | A river is a process, with stages; if we consider it as one thing, we are considering a process [Quine] |
| 8205 | Explaining events just by bodies can't explain two events identical in space-time [Quine] |
| 1630 | We can only see an alien language in terms of our own thought structures (e.g. physical/abstract) [Quine] |
| 11093 | We don't say 'red' is abstract, unlike a river, just because it has discontinuous shape [Quine] |
| 16939 | Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation [Quine] |
| 12210 | Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine] |
| 7416 | Kant is read as the phenomena being 'contrained' by the noumenon, or 'free-floating' [Talbot on Kant] |
| 19386 | Without the subject or the senses, space and time vanish, as their appearances disappear [Kant] |
| 21445 | Even the most perfect intuition gets no closer to things in themselves [Kant] |
| 18438 | Every worldly event, without exception, is a redistribution of microphysical states [Quine] |
| 10243 | My ontology is quarks etc., classes of such things, classes of such classes etc. [Quine] |
| 19042 | Terms learned by ostension tend to be vague, because that must be quick and unrefined [Quine] |
| 8496 | What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine] |
| 11101 | General terms don't commit us ontologically, but singular terms with substitution do [Quine] |
| 19485 | Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine] |
| 10667 | A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack] |
| 1610 | To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine] |
| 19486 | We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine] |
| 5747 | "No entity without identity" - our ontology must contain items with settled identity conditions [Quine, by Melia] |
| 16963 | Existence is implied by the quantifiers, not by the constants [Quine] |
| 16021 | Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan] |
| 16964 | Theories are committed to objects of which some of its predicates must be true [Quine] |
| 8459 | Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 8497 | An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine] |
| 4216 | Express a theory in first-order predicate logic; its ontology is the types of bound variable needed for truth [Quine, by Lowe] |
| 18966 | Ontological commitment of theories only arise if they are classically quantified [Quine] |
| 18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
| 3325 | For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 16261 | If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine] |
| 7698 | If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine] |
| 19492 | Quine is hopeless circular, deriving ontology from what is literal, and 'literal' from good ontology [Yablo on Quine] |
| 14490 | You can be implicitly committed to something without quantifying over it [Thomasson on Quine] |
| 16961 | In formal terms, a category is the range of some style of variables [Quine] |
| 5554 | Categories are necessary, so can't be implanted in us to agree with natural laws [Kant] |
| 21448 | Categories are general concepts of objects, which determine the way in which they are experienced [Kant] |
| 6160 | Does Kant say the mind imposes categories, or that it restricts us to them? [Rowlands on Kant] |
| 16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
| 11096 | Discourse generally departmentalizes itself to some degree [Quine] |
| 8461 | The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine] |
| 8534 | Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| 7925 | There is no proper identity concept for properties, and it is hard to distinguish one from two [Quine] |
| 10295 | Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro] |
| 3322 | Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA] |
| 6078 | Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn] |
| 9017 | Predicates are not names; predicates are the other parties to predication [Quine] |
| 8479 | Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 18439 | Because things can share attributes, we cannot individuate attributes clearly [Quine] |
| 14296 | Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine] |
| 15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine] |
| 16948 | Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity' [Quine] |
| 15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB] |
| 16945 | We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve [Quine] |
| 17772 | Kant claims causal powers are relational rather than intrinsic [Kant, by Bayne] |
| 1612 | Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine] |
| 3751 | Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette] |
| 15402 | There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine] |
| 9006 | Commitment to universals is as arbitrary or pragmatic as the adoption of a new system of bookkeeping [Quine] |
| 4443 | Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong] |
| 11099 | Understanding 'is square' is knowing when to apply it, not knowing some object [Quine] |
| 8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt] |
| 7970 | Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C] |
| 18442 | You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine] |
| 11097 | Red is the largest red thing in the universe [Quine] |
| 11094 | 'Red' is a single concrete object in space-time; 'red' and 'drop' are parts of a red drop [Quine] |
| 21449 | The a priori concept of objects in general is the ground of experience [Kant] |
| 7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine] |
| 1628 | If physical objects are a myth, they are useful for making sense of experience [Quine] |
| 5533 | Objects in themselves are not known to us at all [Kant] |
| 8498 | Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine] |
| 8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine] |
| 9018 | A physical object is the four-dimensional material content of a portion of space-time [Quine] |
| 13387 | Our conceptual scheme becomes more powerful when we posit abstract objects [Quine] |
| 15783 | Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine] |
| 8277 | I prefer 'no object without identity' to Quine's 'no entity without identity' [Lowe on Quine] |
| 18441 | No entity without identity (which requires a principle of individuation) [Quine] |
| 5550 | A substance could exist as a subject, but not as a mere predicate [Kant] |
| 21451 | All appearances need substance, as that which persists through change [Kant] |
| 5564 | Substance must exist, as the persisting substratum of the process of change [Kant] |
| 11833 | The substance, once the predicates are removed, remains unknown to us [Kant] |
| 10923 | Aristotelian essentialism says a thing has some necessary and some non-necessary properties [Quine] |
| 10929 | Aristotelian essence of the object has become the modern essence of meaning [Quine] |
| 10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
| 8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine] |
| 12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine] |
| 13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
| 5626 | An a priori principle of persistence anticipates all experience [Kant] |
| 9019 | Four-d objects helps predication of what no longer exists, and quantification over items from different times [Quine] |
| 17595 | To unite a sequence of ostensions to make one object, a prior concept of identity is needed [Quine] |
| 18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
| 17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine] |
| 18440 | Identity of physical objects is just being coextensive [Quine] |
| 7576 | The Identity of Indiscernibles is true of concepts with identical properties, but not of particulars [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 14509 | If we ignore differences between water drops, we still distinguish them by their location [Kant] |
| 11095 | We should just identify any items which are indiscernible within a given discourse [Quine] |
| 18797 | Modalities do not augment our concepts; they express their relation to cognition [Kant] |
| 10921 | Necessity can attach to statement-names, to statements, and to open sentences [Quine] |
| 14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
| 12188 | Contrary to some claims, Quine does not deny logical necessity [Quine, by McFetridge] |
| 9001 | Frege moved Kant's question about a priori synthetic to 'how is logical certainty possible?' [Quine] |
| 5594 | Natural necessity is the unconditioned necessity of appearances [Kant] |
| 9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 15090 | Quine's attack on the analytic-synthetic distinction undermined necessary truths [Quine, by Shoemaker] |
| 10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
| 10924 | Necessity is in the way in which we say things, and not things themselves [Quine] |
| 4577 | There is no necessity higher than natural necessity, and that is just regularity [Quine] |
| 8206 | Necessity could be just generalisation over classes, or (maybe) quantifying over possibilia [Quine] |
| 8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
| 5566 | Is the possible greater than the actual, and the actual greater than the necessary? [Kant] |
| 5613 | The analytic mark of possibility is that it does not generate a contradiction [Kant] |
| 21410 | That a concept is not self-contradictory does not make what it represents possible [Kant] |
| 18795 | A concept is logically possible if non-contradictory (but may not be actually possible) [Kant] |
| 15782 | Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan] |
| 9014 | Some conditionals can be explained just by negation and conjunction: not(p and not-q) [Quine] |
| 15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine] |
| 15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
| 22432 | Normally conditionals have no truth value; it is the consequent which has a conditional truth value [Quine] |
| 15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine] |
| 15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine] |
| 15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine] |
| 15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine] |
| 6181 | Necessity cannot be extracted from an empirical proposition [Kant] |
| 18796 | Formal experience conditions show what is possible, and general conditions what is necessary [Kant] |
| 23461 | Kant thought worldly necessities are revealed by what maths needs to make sense [Kant, by Morris,M] |
| 14710 | Necessity is always knowable a priori, and what is known a priori is always necessary [Kant, by Schroeter] |
| 16256 | For Kant metaphysics must be necessary, so a priori, so can't be justified by experience [Kant, by Maudlin] |
| 5524 | Maths must be a priori because it is necessary, and that cannot be derived from experience [Kant] |
| 2796 | For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J] |
| 8856 | Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo] |
| 13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
| 12443 | Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine] |
| 9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
| 13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
| 20944 | Knowledge is threefold: apprehension, reproduction by imagination, recognition by concepts [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 21957 | 'Transcendental' concerns how we know, rather than what we know [Kant] |
| 5617 | Knowledge begins with intuitions, moves to concepts, and ends with ideas [Kant] |
| 15627 | Kant showed that the understanding (unlike reason) concerns what is finite and conditioned [Kant, by Hegel] |
| 16898 | Understanding essentially involves singular elements [Kant, by Burge] |
| 5573 | Reason is distinct from understanding, and is the faculty of rules or principles [Kant] |
| 5634 | Opinion is subjectively and objectively insufficient; belief is subjective but not objective; knowledge is both [Kant] |
| 13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
| 18969 | How do you distinguish three beliefs from four beliefs or two beliefs? [Quine] |
| 5590 | 'I think therefore I am' is an identity, not an inference (as there is no major premise) [Kant] |
| 5601 | There are possible inhabitants of the moon, but they are just possible experiences [Kant] |
| 18209 | We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine] |
| 22003 | We have no sensual experience of time and space, so they must be 'ideal' [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21456 | Objects having to be experiencable is not the same as full idealism [Gardner on Kant] |
| 21446 | If we disappeared, then all relations of objects, and time and space themselves, disappear too [Kant] |
| 16923 | I admit there are bodies outside us [Kant] |
| 6909 | In Kantian idealism, objects fit understanding, not vice versa [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 6910 | Kant's idealism is a limited idealism based on the viewpoint of empiricism [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 21440 | For Kant experience is either structured like reality, or generates reality's structure [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 22006 | The concepts that make judgeable experiences possible are created spontaneously [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21441 | 'Transcendental' is not beyond experience, but a prerequisite of experience [Kant] |
| 21442 | 'Transcendental' cognition concerns what can be known a priori of its mode [Kant] |
| 5568 | We cannot know things in themselves, but are confined to appearances [Kant] |
| 5581 | We have proved that bodies are appearances of the outer senses, not things in themselves [Kant] |
| 21956 | Everything we intuit is merely a representation, with no external existence (Transcendental Idealism) [Kant] |
| 21971 | Transcendental philosophy is the subject becoming the originator of unified reality [Kant] |
| 9156 | Kant's shift of view enables us to see a priority in terms of mental capacity, not truth and propositions [Burge on Kant] |
| 7575 | A priori knowledge is limited to objects of possible experience [Kant, by Jolley] |
| 12414 | A priori knowledge occurs absolutely independently of all experience [Kant] |
| 9351 | One sort of a priori knowledge just analyses given concepts, but another ventures further [Kant] |
| 9348 | Experienceless bodies have space; propertyless bodies have substance; this must be seen a priori [Kant] |
| 9379 | A sentence is obvious if it is true, and any speaker of the language will instantly agree to it [Quine] |
| 21081 | We are equipped with the a priori intuitions needed for the concept of right [Kant] |
| 5404 | Two plus two objects make four objects even if experience is impossible, so Kant is wrong [Russell on Kant] |
| 9345 | Propositions involving necessity are a priori, and pure a priori if they only derive from other necessities [Kant] |
| 16893 | The apriori is independent of its sources, and marked by necessity and generality [Kant, by Burge] |
| 9347 | A priori knowledge is indispensable for the possibility and certainty of experience [Kant] |
| 3342 | Seeing that only one parallel can be drawn to a line through a given point is clearly synthetic a priori [Kant, by Benardete,JA] |
| 3726 | The categorical imperative is a practical synthetic a priori proposition [Kant] |
| 20943 | Kant bases the synthetic a priori on the categories of oneness and manyness [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5402 | Kant showed that we have a priori knowledge which is not purely analytic [Kant, by Russell] |
| 5203 | We can think of 7 and 5 without 12, but it is still a contradiction to deny 7+5=12 [Ayer on Kant] |
| 16916 | A priori synthetic knowledge is only of appearances, not of things in themselves [Kant] |
| 5527 | That a straight line is the shortest is synthetic, as straight does not imply any quantity [Kant] |
| 5528 | That force and counter-force are equal is necessary, and a priori synthetic [Kant] |
| 5529 | The real problem of pure reason is: how are a priori synthetic judgments possible? [Kant] |
| 5537 | That two lines cannot enclose a space is an intuitive a priori synthetic proposition [Kant] |
| 5546 | Are a priori concepts necessary as a precondition for something to be an object? [Kant] |
| 5558 | 7+5=12 is not analytic, because 12 is not contained in 7 or 5 or their combination [Kant] |
| 5624 | We possess synthetic a priori knowledge in our principles which anticipate experience [Kant] |
| 5571 | Reason contains within itself certain underived concepts and principles [Kant] |
| 5403 | If, as Kant says, arithmetic and logic are contributed by us, they could change if we did [Russell on Kant] |
| 9005 | Examination of convention in the a priori begins to blur the distinction with empirical knowledge [Quine] |
| 5525 | No analysis of the sum of seven and five will in itself reveal twelve [Kant] |
| 9383 | Metaphysical analyticity (and linguistic necessity) are hopeless, but epistemic analyticity is a priori [Boghossian on Quine] |
| 12424 | Quine challenges the claim that analytic truths are knowable a priori [Quine, by Kitcher] |
| 18262 | For Kant analytic knowledge needs complex concepts, but the a priori can rest on the simple [Coffa on Kant] |
| 16915 | A priori intuitions can only concern the objects of our senses [Kant] |
| 5526 | With large numbers it is obvious that we could never find the sum by analysing the concepts [Kant] |
| 16914 | A priori intuition of objects is only possible by containing the form of my sensibility [Kant] |
| 5567 | A priori the understanding can only anticipate possible experiences [Kant] |
| 9338 | Quine's objections to a priori knowledge only work in the domain of science [Horwich on Quine] |
| 9337 | Science is empirical, simple and conservative; any belief can hence be abandoned; so no a priori [Quine, by Horwich] |
| 9340 | Logic, arithmetic and geometry are revisable and a posteriori; quantum logic could be right [Horwich on Quine] |
| 18264 | We know the shape of a cone from its concept, but we don't know its colour [Kant] |
| 21447 | I can make no sense of the red experience being similar to the quality in the object [Kant] |
| 5532 | Colours and tastes are not qualities of things, but alterations of the subject [Kant] |
| 16924 | I count the primary features of things (as well as the secondary ones) as mere appearances [Kant] |
| 16913 | I can't intuit a present thing in itself, because the properties can't enter my representations [Kant] |
| 21686 | Sense-data are dubious abstractions, with none of the plausibility of tables [Quine] |
| 2774 | Kant says the cognitive and sensory elements in experience can't be separated [Kant, by Dancy,J] |
| 23454 | Appearances have a 'form', which indicates a relational order [Kant] |
| 5569 | We cannot represent objects unless we combine concepts with intuitions [Kant] |
| 1620 | Empiricism makes a basic distinction between truths based or not based on facts [Quine] |
| 8450 | Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 19046 | Empiricism improvements: words for ideas, then sentences, then systems, then no analytic, then naturalism [Quine] |
| 19049 | In scientific theories sentences are too brief to be independent vehicles of empirical meaning [Quine] |
| 1629 | Our outer beliefs must match experience, and our inner ones must be simple [Quine] |
| 23697 | I exist just as an intelligence aware of its faculty for combination [Kant] |
| 22005 | Associations and causes cannot explain content, which needs norms of judgement [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 6577 | For Kant, our conceptual scheme is disastrous when it reaches beyond experience [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 16925 | Appearance gives truth, as long as it is only used within experience [Kant] |
| 21685 | Empiricism says evidence rests on the senses, but that insight is derived from science [Quine] |
| 19488 | The second dogma is linking every statement to some determinate observations [Quine, by Yablo] |
| 5538 | Understanding has no intuitions, and senses no thought, so knowledge needs their unity [Kant] |
| 5559 | Sensations are a posteriori, but that they come in degrees is known a priori [Kant] |
| 8736 | Kantian intuitions are of particulars, and they give immediate knowledge [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 16911 | Intuition is a representation that depends on the presence of the object [Kant] |
| 18260 | If we knew what we know, we would be astonished [Kant] |
| 5541 | A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant] |
| 7070 | Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts [Kant, by Critchley] |
| 7627 | You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine] |
| 8871 | We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson] |
| 8826 | If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine] |
| 8827 | Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine] |
| 8899 | Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine] |
| 4708 | Kant thought he had refuted scepticism, but his critics say he is a sceptic, for rejecting reality [O'Grady on Kant] |
| 5592 | Scepticism is the euthanasia of pure reason [Kant] |
| 5595 | Scepticism is absurd in maths, where there are no hidden false assertions [Kant] |
| 6578 | For Kant, experience is relative to a scheme, but there are no further possible schemes [Kant, by Fogelin] |
| 3868 | To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith] |
| 1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |
| 16944 | Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method [Quine] |
| 5629 | If a proposition implies any false consequences, then it is false [Kant] |
| 4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 21687 | It seems obvious to prefer the simpler of two theories, on grounds of beauty and convenience [Quine] |
| 21688 | There are four suspicious reasons why we prefer simpler theories [Quine] |
| 4713 | For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| 1625 | Statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience as a corporate body [Quine] |
| 16941 | Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause [Quine] |
| 16940 | Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations [Quine] |
| 21748 | More careful inductions gradually lead to the hypothetico-deductive method [Quine] |
| 16933 | Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science [Quine] |
| 15308 | Science is the reduction of diverse forces and powers to a smaller number that explain them [Kant] |
| 5606 | Freedom and natural necessity do not contradict, as they relate to different conditions [Kant] |
| 4086 | Kant thought that consciousness depends on self-consciousness ('apperception') [Kant, by Crane] |
| 2869 | Kant's only answer as to how synthetic a priori judgements are possible was that we have a 'faculty'! [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 5572 | Reason has logical and transcendental faculties [Kant] |
| 9346 | Judgements which are essentially and strictly universal reveal our faculty of a priori cognition [Kant] |
| 22443 | We are seldom aware of imagination, but we would have no cognition at all without it [Kant] |
| 16934 | General terms depend on similarities among things [Quine] |
| 16938 | To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour? [Quine] |
| 8486 | Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine] |
| 16947 | Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine [Quine] |
| 21421 | Within nature man is unimportant, but as moral person he is above any price [Kant] |
| 5627 | I can express the motion of my body in a single point, but that doesn't mean it is a simple substance [Kant] |
| 9751 | To some extent we must view ourselves as noumena [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 21450 | Representation would be impossible without the 'I think' that accompanies it [Kant] |
| 5583 | We need an account of the self based on rational principles, to avoid materialism [Kant] |
| 5570 | Self-knowledge can only be inner sensation, and thus appearance [Kant] |
| 5551 | I have no cognition of myself as I am, but only as I appear to myself [Kant] |
| 21452 | I can only determine my existence in time via external things [Kant] |
| 5582 | As balls communicate motion, so substances could communicate consciousness, but not retain identity [Kant] |
| 2965 | For Kant the self is a purely formal idea, not a substance [Kant, by Lockwood] |
| 5549 | Mental representations would not be mine if they did not belong to a unified self-consciousness [Kant] |
| 5596 | We must assume an absolute causal spontaneity beginning from itself [Kant] |
| 3739 | Free will is a kind of causality which works independently of other causes [Kant] |
| 3741 | We shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible [Kant] |
| 21053 | The manifest will in the world of phenomena has to conform to the laws of nature [Kant] |
| 9756 | We must be free, because we can act against our strongest desires [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 5597 | If there is a first beginning, there can be other sequences initiated from nothing [Kant] |
| 3740 | We cannot conceive of reason as being externally controlled [Kant] |
| 5296 | Kant made the political will into a pure self-determined "free" will [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| 5585 | Soul and body connect physically, or by harmony, or by assistance [Kant] |
| 5630 | Our concept of an incorporeal nature is merely negative [Kant] |
| 5589 | Neither materialism nor spiritualism can reveal the separate existence of the soul [Kant] |
| 3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
| 8462 | A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine] |
| 5556 | A pure concept of the understanding can never become an image [Kant] |
| 24011 | Kant thought emotions are too random and passive to be part of morality [Kant, by Williams,B] |
| 8687 | Kantian 'intuition' is the bridge between pure reason and its application to sense experiences [Kant, by Friend] |
| 21759 | Kant deduced the categories from our judgements, and then as preconditions of experience [Kant, by Houlgate] |
| 19655 | Kant says we can describe the categories of thought, but Hegel claims to deduce them [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 5552 | Categories are concepts that prescribe laws a priori to appearances [Kant] |
| 5544 | Four groups of categories of concept: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Modality [Kant] |
| 5547 | The categories are objectively valid, because they make experience possible [Kant] |
| 17616 | Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind [Kant] |
| 5553 | Either experience creates concepts, or concepts make experience possible [Kant] |
| 5593 | Reason generates no concepts, but frees them from their link to experience in the understanding [Kant] |
| 22004 | Concepts are rules for combining representations [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 5543 | All human cognition is through concepts [Kant] |
| 16912 | Some concepts can be made a priori, which are general thoughts of objects, like quantity or cause [Kant] |
| 8735 | Kant implies that concepts have analysable parts [Kant, by Shapiro] |
| 11104 | Concepts are language [Quine] |
| 11102 | Apply '-ness' or 'class of' to abstract general terms, to get second-level abstract singular terms [Quine] |
| 1626 | It is troublesome nonsense to split statements into a linguistic and a factual component [Quine] |
| 8898 | Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine] |
| 22430 | If we understand a statement, we know the circumstances of its truth [Quine] |
| 21700 | Taking sentences as the unit of meaning makes useful paraphrasing possible [Quine] |
| 21701 | Knowing a word is knowing the meanings of sentences which contain it [Quine] |
| 1619 | There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine] |
| 7317 | 'Renate' and 'cordate' have identical extensions, but are not synonymous [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| 9009 | Single words are strongly synonymous if their interchange preserves truth [Quine] |
| 1621 | Once meaning and reference are separated, meaning ceases to seem important [Quine] |
| 9471 | Intensions are creatures of darkness which should be exorcised [Quine] |
| 8202 | Meaning is essence divorced from things and wedded to words [Quine] |
| 1609 | I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine] |
| 1617 | The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine] |
| 4712 | Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady] |
| 8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 15788 | Syntax and semantics are indeterminate, and modern 'semantics' is a bogus subject [Quine, by Lycan] |
| 19159 | Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson] |
| 16932 | Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer [Quine] |
| 18967 | A 'proposition' is said to be the timeless cognitive part of the meaning of a sentence [Quine] |
| 18968 | The problem with propositions is their individuation. When do two sentences express one proposition? [Quine] |
| 9007 | It makes no sense to say that two sentences express the same proposition [Quine] |
| 9008 | There is no rule for separating the information from other features of sentences [Quine] |
| 9010 | We can abandon propositions, and just talk of sentences and equivalence [Quine] |
| 8734 | Non-subject/predicate tautologies won't fit Kant's definition of analyticity [Shapiro on Kant] |
| 7314 | How can bachelor 'contain' unmarried man? Are all analytic truths in subject-predicate form? [Miller,A on Kant] |
| 16926 | Analytic judgements say clearly what was in the concept of the subject [Kant] |
| 16927 | Analytic judgement rests on contradiction, since the predicate cannot be denied of the subject [Kant] |
| 20291 | If the predicate is contained in the subject of a judgement, it is analytic; otherwise synthetic [Kant] |
| 20292 | Analytic judgements clarify, by analysing the subject into its component predicates [Kant] |
| 9371 | Analytic statements are either logical truths (all reinterpretations) or they depend on synonymy [Quine] |
| 19487 | Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine] |
| 1622 | Did someone ever actually define 'bachelor' as 'unmarried man'? [Quine] |
| 9366 | Quine's attack on analyticity undermined linguistic views of necessity, and analytic views of the a priori [Quine, by Boghossian] |
| 14473 | Quine attacks the Fregean idea that we can define analyticity through synonyous substitution [Quine, by Thomasson] |
| 7321 | The last two parts of 'Two Dogmas' are much the best [Miller,A on Quine] |
| 8803 | Erasing the analytic/synthetic distinction got rid of meanings, and saved philosophy of language [Davidson on Quine] |
| 17737 | The analytic needs excessively small units of meaning and empirical confirmation [Quine, by Jenkins] |
| 1624 | If we try to define analyticity by synonymy, that leads back to analyticity [Quine] |
| 8900 | In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine] |
| 8201 | The distinction between meaning and further information is as vague as the essence/accident distinction [Quine] |
| 19050 | Holism in language blurs empirical synthetic and empty analytic sentences [Quine] |
| 21338 | I will even consider changing a meaning to save a law; I question the meaning-fact cleavage [Quine] |
| 9021 | A good way of explaining an expression is saying what conditions make its contexts true [Quine] |
| 19045 | Translation is too flimsy a notion to support theories of cultural incommensurability [Quine] |
| 3988 | Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine] |
| 6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine] |
| 6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine] |
| 6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine] |
| 6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine] |
| 1631 | You could know the complete behavioural conditions for a foreign language, and still not know their beliefs [Quine] |
| 1632 | Translation of our remote past or language could be as problematic as alien languages [Quine] |
| 18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
| 6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine] |
| 6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine] |
| 7330 | The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A] |
| 6183 | Can pure reason determine the will, or are empirical conditions relevant? [Kant] |
| 6191 | The will is the faculty of purposes, which guide desires according to principles [Kant] |
| 21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
| 6190 | The sole objects of practical reason are the good and the evil [Kant] |
| 12157 | Kant gave form and status to aesthetics, and Hegel gave it content [Kant, by Scruton] |
| 20346 | The aesthetic attitude is a matter of disinterestedness [Kant, by Wollheim] |
| 18547 | Only rational beings can experience beauty [Kant, by Scruton] |
| 24172 | It is hard to see why we would have developed Kant's 'disinterested' aesthetic attitude [Cochrane on Kant] |
| 20408 | With respect to the senses, taste is an entirely personal matter [Kant] |
| 20409 | When we judge beauty, it isn't just personal; we judge on behalf of everybody [Kant] |
| 20411 | Saying everyone has their own taste destroys the very idea of taste [Kant] |
| 24170 | Kant thinks beauty ignores its objects, because it is only 'form' engaging with mind [Cochrane on Kant] |
| 22711 | The beautiful is not conceptualised as moral, but it symbolises or resembles goodness [Kant, by Murdoch] |
| 4025 | Kant saw beauty as a sort of disinterested pleasure, which has become separate from the good [Kant, by Taylor,C] |
| 20412 | Beauty is only judged in pure contemplation, and not with something else at stake [Kant] |
| 22046 | The mathematical sublime is immeasurable greatness; the dynamical sublime is overpowering [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 21458 | The sublime is a moral experience [Kant, by Gardner] |
| 5643 | Aesthetic values are not objectively valid, but we must treat them as if they are [Kant, by Scruton] |
| 20410 | The judgement of beauty is not cognitive, but relates, via imagination, to pleasurable feelings [Kant] |
| 5599 | Without God, creation and free will, morality would be empty [Kant] |
| 21415 | Duty is impossible without prior moral feeling, conscience, love and self-respect [Kant] |
| 5074 | Kant united religion and philosophy, by basing obedience to law on reason instead of faith [Taylor,R on Kant] |
| 8024 | The categorical imperative says nothing about what our activities and ends should be [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 18235 | Only human reason can confer value on our choices [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 22390 | Kant thought human nature was pure hedonism, so virtue is only possible via the categorical imperative [Foot on Kant] |
| 21409 | Moral principles do not involve feelings [Kant] |
| 6196 | People cannot come to morality through feeling, because morality must not be sensuous [Kant] |
| 9750 | We must only value what others find acceptable [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 20160 | Kant focuses exclusively on human values, and neglects cultural and personal values [Kekes on Kant] |
| 21749 | Altruistic values concern other persons, and ceremonial values concern practices [Quine] |
| 5576 | We cannot derive moral laws from experience, as it is the mother of illusion [Kant] |
| 9749 | Our rational choices confer value, arising from the sense that we ourselves are important [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 7671 | Values are created by human choices, and are not some intrinsic quality, out there [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 18675 | Kant may rate two things as finally valuable: having a good will, and deserving happiness [Orsi on Kant] |
| 22007 | An autonomous agent has dignity [Würde], which has absolute worth [Kant, by Pinkard] |
| 18234 | The good will is unconditionally good, because it is the only possible source of value [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 6192 | Good or evil cannot be a thing, but only a maxim of action, making the person good or evil [Kant] |
| 18239 | What is contemplated must have a higher value than contemplation [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 18238 | Only a good will can give man's being, and hence the world, a final purpose [Kant] |
| 21431 | The love of man is required in order to present the world as a beautiful and perfect moral whole [Kant] |
| 21437 | All morality directs the will to love of others' ends, and respect for others' rights [Kant] |
| 21455 | We only understand what exists, and can find no sign of what ought to be in nature [Kant] |
| 3720 | We may claim noble motives, but we cannot penetrate our secret impulses [Kant] |
| 3717 | Reverence is awareness of a value which demolishes my self-love [Kant] |
| 21429 | The duty of love is to makes the ends of others one's own [Kant] |
| 21751 | Love seems to diminish with distance from oneself [Quine] |
| 3712 | A good will is not good because of what it achieves [Kant] |
| 3725 | The good of an action is in the mind of the doer, not the consequences [Kant] |
| 6197 | Morality involves duty and respect for law, not love of the outcome [Kant] |
| 6193 | Our happiness is all that matters, not as a sensation, but as satisfaction with our whole existence [Kant] |
| 1452 | Happiness is the condition of a rational being for whom everything goes as they wish [Kant] |
| 1454 | Morality is not about making ourselves happy, but about being worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| 21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
| 3733 | The 'golden rule' cannot be a universal law as it implies no duties [Kant] |
| 22442 | If lies were ever acceptable, with would undermine all duties based on contract [Kant] |
| 3736 | Virtue lets a rational being make universal law, and share in the kingdom of ends [Kant] |
| 6194 | The highest worth for human beings lies in dispositions, not just actions [Kant] |
| 6198 | Virtue is the supreme state of our pursuit of happiness, and so is supreme good [Kant] |
| 21411 | A duty of virtue is a duty which is also an end [Kant] |
| 21413 | Virtue is strong maxims for duty [Kant] |
| 21414 | The supreme principle of virtue is to find universal laws for ends [Kant] |
| 3544 | Kant thinks virtue becomes passive, and hence morally unaccountable [Kant, by Annas] |
| 1456 | Moral law is holy, and the best we can do is achieve virtue through respect for the law [Kant] |
| 21436 | We are obliged to show the social virtues, but at least they make a virtuous disposition fashionable [Kant] |
| 21419 | If virtue becomes a habit, that is a loss of the freedom needed for adopting maxims [Kant] |
| 21417 | How do we distinguish a mean? The extremes can involve quite different maxims [Kant] |
| 21420 | If virtue is the mean between vices, then virtue is just the vanishing of vice [Kant] |
| 21418 | There is one principle of virtues; the virtues are distinguished by their objects [Kant] |
| 7674 | Generosity and pity are vices, because they falsely imply one person's superiority to another [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 21029 | Kantian respect is for humanity and reason (not from love or sympathy or solidarity) [Kant, by Sandel] |
| 21425 | We can love without respect, and show respect without love [Kant] |
| 21427 | Respect is limiting our self-esteem by attending to the human dignity of other persons [Kant] |
| 21430 | Disrespect is using a person as a mere means to my own ends [Kant] |
| 21428 | Respect is purely negative (of not exalting oneself over others), and is thus a duty of Right [Kant] |
| 21426 | Love urges us to get closer to people, but respect to keep our distance [Kant] |
| 21434 | We must respect the humanity even in a vicious criminal [Kant] |
| 7105 | If 'maxims' are deeper underlying intentions, Kant can be read as a virtue theorist [Kant, by Statman] |
| 7625 | We can ask how rational goodness is, but also why is rationality good [Putnam on Kant] |
| 4024 | Kant follows Rousseau in defining freedom and morality in terms of each other [Taylor,C on Kant] |
| 3710 | The only purely good thing is a good will [Kant] |
| 3737 | The will is good if its universalised maxim is never in conflict with itself [Kant] |
| 3715 | Other causes can produce nice results, so morality must consist in the law, found only in rational beings [Kant] |
| 20715 | It is basic that moral actions must be done from duty [Kant] |
| 3718 | Telling the truth from duty is quite different from doing so to avoid inconvenience [Kant] |
| 3723 | There are no imperatives for a holy will, as the will is in harmony with moral law [Kant] |
| 21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
| 3735 | Men are subject to laws which are both self-made and universal [Kant] |
| 3714 | Dutiful actions are judged not by purpose, but by the maxim followed [Kant] |
| 5295 | Kant was happy with 'good will', even if it had no result [Kant, by Marx/Engels] |
| 6695 | Kant has to attribute high moral worth to some deeply unattractive human lives [Kant, by Graham] |
| 8028 | Kantian duty seems to imply conformism with authority [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 22441 | The law will protect you if you tell a truth which results in murder [Kant] |
| 3724 | A categorical imperative sees an action as necessary purely for its own sake [Kant] |
| 8026 | Almost any precept can be consistently universalized [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 6185 | No one would lend money unless a universal law made it secure, even after death [Kant] |
| 6187 | Universality determines the will, and hence extends self-love into altruism [Kant] |
| 15673 | The intuition behind the categorical imperative is that one ought not to make an exception of oneself [Kant, by Finlayson] |
| 8068 | Universalising a maxim needs to first stipulate the right description for the action [Anscombe on Kant] |
| 8025 | The categorical imperative will not suggest maxims suitable for testing [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 8027 | I can universalize a selfish maxim, if it is expressed in a way that only applies to me [MacIntyre on Kant] |
| 3728 | Suicide, false promises, neglected talent, and lack of charity all involve contradictions of principle [Kant, by PG] |
| 22008 | Always treat yourself and others as an end, and never simply as a means [Kant] |
| 22009 | Morality is the creation of the laws that enable a Kingdom of Ends [Kant] |
| 3719 | If lying were the universal law it would make promises impossible [Kant] |
| 3762 | Why couldn't all rational beings accept outrageously immoral rules of conduct? [Mill on Kant] |
| 4413 | The categorical imperative smells of cruelty [Nietzsche on Kant] |
| 3716 | Act according to a maxim you can will as a universal law [Kant] |
| 3727 | Act as if your maxim were to become a universal law of nature [Kant] |
| 22050 | The maxim of an action is chosen, and not externally imposed [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 6694 | Always treat humanity as an end and never as a means only [Kant] |
| 3731 | Rational beings necessarily conceive their own existence as an end in itself [Kant] |
| 6201 | Everyone (even God) must treat rational beings as ends in themselves, and not just as means [Kant] |
| 5605 | Moral blame is based on reason, since a reason is a cause which should have been followed [Kant] |
| 5632 | Moral laws are commands, which must involve promises and threats, which only God could provide [Kant] |
| 4345 | For Kant, even a person who lacks all sympathy for others still has a motive for benevolence [Kant, by Hursthouse] |
| 4251 | If we are required to give moral thought the highest priority, this gives morality no content [Williams,B on Kant] |
| 16004 | If Kant lives by self-administered laws, this is as feeble as self-administered punishments [Kierkegaard on Kant] |
| 3711 | Only a good will makes us worthy of happiness [Kant] |
| 3713 | The function of reason is to produce a good will [Kant] |
| 3729 | Our inclinations are not innately desirable; in fact most rational beings would like to be rid of them [Kant] |
| 4344 | Actions where people spread happiness because they enjoy it have no genuine moral worth [Kant] |
| 6186 | A holy will is incapable of any maxims which conflict with the moral law [Kant] |
| 6195 | Reason cannot solve the problem of why a law should motivate the will [Kant] |
| 21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
| 6916 | For Kant, essence is mental and a mere idea, and existence is the senses and mere appearance [Kant, by Feuerbach] |
| 21412 | Humans are distinguished from animals by their capacity to set themselves any sort of end [Kant] |
| 21435 | Man is both social, and unsociable [Kant] |
| 21075 | The state of nature always involves the threat of war [Kant] |
| 3732 | Rational beings have a right to share in the end of an action, not just be part of the means [Kant] |
| 21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
| 21082 | A power-based state of nature may not be unjust, but there is no justice without competent judges [Kant] |
| 21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
| 21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
| 21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
| 20569 | Kant made the social contract international and cosmopolitan [Kant, by Oksala] |
| 21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
| 21079 | The a priori general will of a people shows what is right [Kant] |
| 21077 | Each nation should, from self-interest, join an international security constitution [Kant] |
| 21078 | A constitution must always be improved when necessary [Kant] |
| 21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
| 21089 | Monarchs have the highest power; autocrats have complete power [Kant] |
| 21086 | Hereditary nobility has not been earned, and probably won't be earned [Kant] |
| 21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
| 5575 | An obvious idea is a constitution based on maximum mutual freedom for citizens [Kant] |
| 21055 | Our aim is a constitution which combines maximum freedom with strong restraint [Kant] |
| 21056 | The vitality of business needs maximum freedom (while avoiding harm to others) [Kant] |
| 21080 | Actions are right if the maxim respects universal mutual freedoms [Kant] |
| 21083 | Women have no role in politics [Kant] |
| 21058 | Enlightenment requires the free use of reason in the public realm [Kant] |
| 7670 | Kant is the father of the notion of exploitation as an evil [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 5621 | The existence of reason depends on the freedom of citizens to agree, doubt and veto ideas [Kant] |
| 21076 | Equality is where you cannot impose a legal obligation you yourself wouldn't endure [Kant] |
| 21407 | Equality is not being bound in ways you cannot bind others [Kant] |
| 21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
| 20570 | There is now a growing universal community, and violations of rights are felt everywhere [Kant] |
| 20571 | There are political and inter-national rights, but also universal cosmopolitan rights [Kant] |
| 21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
| 21084 | In the contract people lose their rights, but immediately regain them, in the new commonwealth [Kant] |
| 21090 | If someone has largely made something, then they own it [Kant] |
| 21057 | The highest ideal of social progress is a universal cosmopolitan existence [Kant] |
| 21087 | Human life is pointless without justice [Kant] |
| 7591 | Kant completed Grotius's project of a non-religious basis for natural law [Scruton on Kant] |
| 21088 | Justice asserts the death penalty for murder, from a priori laws [Kant] |
| 7673 | Retributive punishment is better than being sent to hospital for your crimes [Kant, by Berlin] |
| 21433 | Violation of rights deserves punishment, which is vengeance, rather than restitution [Kant] |
| 21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |
| 21073 | Hiring soldiers is to use them as instruments, ignoring their personal rights [Kant] |
| 21074 | Some trust in the enemy is needed during wartime, or peace would be impossible [Kant] |
| 21085 | The church has a political role, by offering a supreme power over people [Kant] |
| 19739 | The maxim for suicide is committed to the value of life, and is thus contradictory [Kant] |
| 6188 | A permanent natural order could not universalise a rule permitting suicide [Kant] |
| 6005 | Animals are dangerous and nourishing, and can't form contracts of justice [Hermarchus, by Sedley] |
| 3730 | Non-rational beings only have a relative value, as means rather than as ends [Kant] |
| 21423 | Men can only have duties to those who qualify as persons [Kant] |
| 21424 | Cruelty to animals is bad because it dulls our empathy for pain in humans [Kant] |
| 22052 | Kant's nature is just a system of necessary laws [Bowie on Kant] |
| 8256 | Kant identifies nature with the scientific picture of it as the realm of law [Kant, by McDowell] |
| 22053 | The Critique of Judgement aims for a principle that unities humanity and nature [Kant, by Bowie] |
| 5591 | Reason must assume as necessary that everything in a living organism has a proportionate purpose [Kant] |
| 18237 | Without men creation would be in vain, and without final purpose [Kant] |
| 5615 | Extension and impenetrability together make the concept of matter [Kant] |
| 7375 | Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Quine, by Dennett] |
| 16935 | If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another [Quine] |
| 16936 | Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red' [Quine] |
| 16937 | You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle [Quine] |
| 14560 | A ball denting a pillow seems like simultaneous cause and effect, though time identifies which is cause [Kant] |
| 10370 | Causal relata are individuated by coarse spacetime regions [Quine, by Schaffer,J] |
| 5545 | Appearances give rules of what usually happens, but cause involves necessity [Kant] |
| 9755 | The concept of causality entails laws; random causality is a contradiction [Kant, by Korsgaard] |
| 17709 | We judge causation by relating events together by some law of nature [Kant, by Mares] |
| 5562 | Experience is only possible because we subject appearances to causal laws [Kant] |
| 5523 | Causation obviously involves necessity, so it cannot just be frequent association [Kant] |
| 16942 | It is hard to see how regularities could be explained [Quine] |
| 19669 | For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux] |
| 19672 | Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant] |
| 17862 | Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog] |
| 10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |
| 16922 | Space must have three dimensions, because only three lines can meet at right angles [Kant] |
| 17736 | We can't learn of space through experience; experience of space needs its representation [Kant] |
| 5531 | Space is an a priori necessary basic intuition, as we cannot imagine its absence [Kant] |
| 18970 | The concept of a 'point' makes no sense without the idea of absolute position [Quine] |
| 16921 | If all empirical sensation of bodies is removed, space and time are still left [Kant] |
| 5536 | If space and time exist absolutely, we must assume the existence of two pointless non-entities [Kant] |
| 5534 | One can never imagine appearances without time, so it is given a priori [Kant] |
| 5535 | That times cannot be simultaneous is synthetic, so it is known by intuition, not analysis [Kant] |
| 5560 | The three modes of time are persistence, succession and simultaneity [Kant] |
| 5561 | If time involved succession, we must think of another time in which succession occurs [Kant] |
| 13713 | Quine holds time to be 'space-like': past objects are as real as spatially remote ones [Quine, by Sider] |
| 3721 | We judge God to be good by a priori standards of moral perfection [Kant] |
| 5633 | We don't accept duties as coming from God, but assume they are divine because they are duties [Kant] |
| 8046 | We can only know we should obey God if we already have moral standards for judging God [Kant, by MacIntyre] |
| 6199 | Obligation does not rest on the existence of God, but on the autonomy of reason [Kant] |
| 5607 | Only three proofs of God: the physico-theological (evidence), the cosmological (existence), the ontological (a priori) [Kant] |
| 5609 | If 'this exists' is analytic, either the thing is a thought, or you have presupposed its existence [Kant] |
| 5610 | If an existential proposition is synthetic, you must be able to cancel its predicate without contradiction [Kant] |
| 5611 | Being is not a real predicate, that adds something to a concept [Kant] |
| 5612 | You add nothing to the concept of God or coins if you say they exist [Kant] |
| 8451 | Existence is merely derived from the word 'is' (rather than being a predicate) [Kant, by Orenstein] |
| 3321 | Modern logic says (with Kant) that existence is not a predicate, because it has been reclassified as a quantifier [Benardete,JA on Kant] |
| 13732 | Kant never denied that 'exist' could be a predicate - only that it didn't enlarge concepts [Kant, by Fitting/Mendelsohn] |
| 5608 | Is "This thing exists" analytic or synthetic? [Kant] |
| 20714 | God is not proved by reason, but is a postulate of moral thinking [Kant, by Davies,B] |
| 1453 | We have to postulate something outside nature which makes happiness coincide with morality [Kant] |
| 1455 | Belief in justice requires belief in a place for justice (heaven), a time (eternity), and a cause (God) [Kant, by PG] |
| 5598 | If you prove God cosmologically, by a regress in the sequences of causes, you can't abandon causes at the end [Kant] |
| 6205 | To know if this world must have been created by God, we would need to know all other possible worlds [Kant] |
| 6204 | Using God to explain nature is referring to something inconceivable to explain what is in front of you [Kant] |
| 6206 | From our limited knowledge we can infer great virtues in God, but not ultimate ones [Kant] |
| 6202 | In all naturalistic concepts of God, if you remove the human qualities there is nothing left [Kant] |