Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Herodotus, Brian Ellis and David Bostock

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229 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Essentialism says metaphysics can't be done by analysing unreliable language [Ellis]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
Venn Diagrams map three predicates into eight compartments, then look for the conclusion [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / b. Terminology of PL
'Disjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no conjunction has a disjunction within its scope [Bostock]
'Conjunctive Normal Form' is ensuring that no disjunction has a conjunction within its scope [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / d. Basic theorems of PL
'Disjunction' says that Γ,φ∨ψ|= iff Γ,φ|= and Γ,ψ|= [Bostock]
'Assumptions' says that a formula entails itself (φ|=φ) [Bostock]
'Thinning' allows that if premisses entail a conclusion, then adding further premisses makes no difference [Bostock]
The 'conditional' is that Γ|=φ→ψ iff Γ,φ|=ψ [Bostock]
'Cutting' allows that if x is proved, and adding y then proves z, you can go straight to z [Bostock]
'Negation' says that Γ,¬φ|= iff Γ|=φ [Bostock]
'Conjunction' says that Γ|=φ∧ψ iff Γ|=φ and Γ|=ψ [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
A logic with ¬ and → needs three axiom-schemas and one rule as foundation [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
A 'free' logic can have empty names, and a 'universally free' logic can have empty domains [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock]
The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Truth is the basic notion in classical logic [Bostock]
Elementary logic cannot distinguish clearly between the finite and the infinite [Bostock]
Fictional characters wreck elementary logic, as they have contradictions and no excluded middle [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 3. Deductive Consequence |-
The syntactic turnstile |- φ means 'there is a proof of φ' or 'φ is a theorem' [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Validity is a conclusion following for premises, even if there is no proof [Bostock]
It seems more natural to express |= as 'therefore', rather than 'entails' [Bostock]
Γ|=φ is 'entails'; Γ|= is 'is inconsistent'; |=φ is 'valid' [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 5. Modus Ponens
MPP: 'If Γ|=φ and Γ|=φ→ψ then Γ|=ψ' (omit Γs for Detachment) [Bostock]
MPP is a converse of Deduction: If Γ |- φ→ψ then Γ,φ|-ψ [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
The sign '=' is a two-place predicate expressing that 'a is the same thing as b' (a=b) [Bostock]
|= α=α and α=β |= φ(α/ξ ↔ φ(β/ξ) fix identity [Bostock]
If we are to express that there at least two things, we need identity [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Truth-functors are usually held to be defined by their truth-tables [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 5. Functions in Logic
A 'zero-place' function just has a single value, so it is a name [Bostock]
A 'total' function ranges over the whole domain, a 'partial' function over appropriate inputs [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
In logic, a name is just any expression which refers to a particular single object [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
An expression is only a name if it succeeds in referring to a real object [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / b. Definite descriptions
Definite desciptions resemble names, but can't actually be names, if they don't always refer [Bostock]
Because of scope problems, definite descriptions are best treated as quantifiers [Bostock]
Definite descriptions are usually treated like names, and are just like them if they uniquely refer [Bostock]
We are only obliged to treat definite descriptions as non-names if only the former have scope [Bostock]
Definite descriptions don't always pick out one thing, as in denials of existence, or errors [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Names do not have scope problems (e.g. in placing negation), but Russell's account does have that problem [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
'Prenex normal form' is all quantifiers at the beginning, out of the scope of truth-functors [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
If we allow empty domains, we must allow empty names [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 1. Proof Systems
An 'informal proof' is in no particular system, and uses obvious steps and some ordinary English [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
Quantification adds two axiom-schemas and a new rule [Bostock]
Axiom systems from Frege, Russell, Church, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, Nicod, Kleene, Quine... [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 3. Proof from Assumptions
'Conditonalised' inferences point to the Deduction Theorem: If Γ,φ|-ψ then Γ|-φ→ψ [Bostock]
Proof by Assumptions can always be reduced to Proof by Axioms, using the Deduction Theorem [Bostock]
The Deduction Theorem and Reductio can 'discharge' assumptions - they aren't needed for the new truth [Bostock]
The Deduction Theorem greatly simplifies the search for proof [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock]
Natural deduction takes proof from assumptions (with its rules) as basic, and axioms play no part [Bostock]
Excluded middle is an introduction rule for negation, and ex falso quodlibet will eliminate it [Bostock]
In natural deduction we work from the premisses and the conclusion, hoping to meet in the middle [Bostock]
Natural deduction rules for → are the Deduction Theorem (→I) and Modus Ponens (→E) [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 5. Tableau Proof
Tableau proofs use reduction - seeking an impossible consequence from an assumption [Bostock]
A completed open branch gives an interpretation which verifies those formulae [Bostock]
Non-branching rules add lines, and branching rules need a split; a branch with a contradiction is 'closed' [Bostock]
In a tableau proof no sequence is established until the final branch is closed; hypotheses are explored [Bostock]
Unlike natural deduction, semantic tableaux have recipes for proving things [Bostock]
A tree proof becomes too broad if its only rule is Modus Ponens [Bostock]
Tableau rules are all elimination rules, gradually shortening formulae [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 6. Sequent Calculi
Each line of a sequent calculus is a conclusion of previous lines, each one explicitly recorded [Bostock]
A sequent calculus is good for comparing proof systems [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Interpretation by assigning objects to names, or assigning them to variables first [Bostock, by PG]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis]
Extensionality is built into ordinary logic semantics; names have objects, predicates have sets of objects [Bostock]
If an object has two names, truth is undisturbed if the names are swapped; this is Extensionality [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
For 'negation-consistent', there is never |-(S)φ and |-(S)¬φ [Bostock]
A proof-system is 'absolutely consistent' iff we don't have |-(S)φ for every formula [Bostock]
A set of formulae is 'inconsistent' when there is no interpretation which can make them all true [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Inconsistency or entailment just from functors and quantifiers is finitely based, if compact [Bostock]
Compactness means an infinity of sequents on the left will add nothing new [Bostock]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock]
ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock]
The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / i. Reals from cuts
For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Ordinary or mathematical induction assumes for the first, then always for the next, and hence for all [Bostock]
Complete induction assumes for all numbers less than n, then also for n, and hence for all numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock]
Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock]
There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock]
Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 3. Mathematical Nominalism
Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock]
Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / b. Indispensability of mathematics
Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock]
Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock]
Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock]
Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 9. Fictional Mathematics
Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock]
A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock]
Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock]
Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock]
If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock]
If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock]
The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock]
The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Relations can be one-many (at most one on the left) or many-one (at most one on the right) [Bostock]
A relation is not reflexive, just because it is transitive and symmetrical [Bostock]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Properties are 'dispositional', or 'categorical' (the latter as 'block' or 'intrinsic' structures) [Ellis, by PG]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis]
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis]
The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis]
The passive view of nature says categorical properties are basic, but others say dispositions [Ellis]
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Redness is not a property as it is not mind-independent [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis]
Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis]
Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Properties have powers; they aren't just ways for logicians to classify objects [Ellis]
Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis]
Nearly all fundamental properties of physics are dispositional [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis]
Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis]
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis]
There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Kripke and others have made essentialism once again respectable [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
'Individual essences' fix a particular individual, and 'kind essences' fix the kind it belongs to [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties are usually quantitatively determinate [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
'Real essence' makes it what it is; 'nominal essence' makes us categorise it a certain way [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
If non-existent things are self-identical, they are just one thing - so call it the 'null object' [Bostock]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
One thing can look like something else, without being the something else [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
The idea that anything which can be proved is necessary has a problem with empty names [Bostock]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Scientific essentialists say science should define the limits of the possible [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Essentialists deny possible worlds, and say possibilities are what is compatible with the actual world [Ellis]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis]
Metaphysical necessities are true in virtue of the essences of things [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
Essentialists say natural laws are in a new category: necessary a posteriori [Ellis]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
Imagination tests what is possible for all we know, not true possibility [Ellis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
Possible worlds realism is only needed to give truth conditions for modals and conditionals [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Essentialists mostly accept the primary/secondary qualities distinction [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Primary qualities are number, figure, size, texture, motion, configuration, impenetrability and (?) mass [Ellis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Emeralds are naturally green, and only an external force could turn them blue [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Good explanations unify [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
Essentialists don't infer from some to all, but from essences to necessary behaviour [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates assert properties, values, denials, relations, conventions, existence and fabrications [Ellis, by PG]
A (modern) predicate is the result of leaving a gap for the name in a sentence [Bostock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / c. Agent causation
Regularity theories of causation cannot give an account of human agency [Ellis]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Humans have variable dispositions, and also power to change their dispositions [Ellis]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Essentialism fits in with Darwinism, but not with extreme politics of left or right [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Natural kinds are of objects/substances, or events/processes, or intrinsic natures [Ellis]
The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds
There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis]
Essentialism says natural kinds are fundamental to nature, and determine the laws [Ellis]
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
For essentialists two members of a natural kind must be identical [Ellis]
The whole of our world is a natural kind, so all worlds like it necessarily have the same laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Essentialists regard inanimate objects as genuine causal agents [Ellis]
Essentialists believe causation is necessary, resulting from dispositions and circumstances [Ellis]
A general theory of causation is only possible in an area if natural kinds are involved [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
For 'passivists' behaviour is imposed on things from outside [Ellis]
The laws of nature imitate the hierarchy of natural kinds [Ellis]
Laws of nature tend to describe ideal things, or ideal circumstances [Ellis]
We must explain the necessity, idealisation, ontology and structure of natural laws [Ellis]
Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Causal relations cannot be reduced to regularities, as they could occur just once [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis]
What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis]
Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis]
The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis]
Essentialists say dispositions are basic, rather than supervenient on matter and natural laws [Ellis]
The essence of uranium is its atomic number and its electron shell [Ellis]
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis]
For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Essentialism requires a clear separation of semantics, epistemology and ontology [Ellis]
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The Egyptians were the first to say the soul is immortal and reincarnated [Herodotus]